"Some Animals Are More Equal than Others" -  A Posthumanist Reading of George Orwell's Animal Farm by Hirvisaari, Janne
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Some Animals Are More Equal than Others” – A Posthumanist 
Reading of George Orwell’s Animal Farm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Janne Hirvisaari 
University of Tampere 
School of Language, Translation and Literary Studies 
English Language and Literature 
          Pro Gradu Thesis 
April 2016 
  
Tampereen yliopisto  
Kieli-, käännös- ja kirjallisuustieteiden yksikkö  
Englannin kielen ja kirjallisuuden maisteriopinnot  
 
HIRVISAARI, JANNE: “Some Animals Are More Equal than Others” – A Posthumanist 
Reading of George Orwell’s Animal Farm 
 
Pro gradu -tutkielma, 75 sivua  
Huhtikuu 2016 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Tarkastelen pro gradu -tutkielmassani George Orwellin romaania Animal Farm (1945) sen 
eläinhahmojen ja erityisesti lajien välisen tasa-arvon näkökulmasta. Vaikka teoksen 
päähenkilöt ovat eläimiä ja lähtökohta ihmisten ja eläinten välinen konflikti, kirjaa käsittelevä 
kritiikki ja tutkimus on lähes poikkeuksetta keskittynyt sen sisältämään poliittiseen 
symbolismiin. Tutkimukseni hypoteesi on, että kohdeteos kommentoi lajien välistä tasa-
arvoa, eläinten kohtelua yhteiskunnassa sekä lajikeskustelussa esiintyvää ihmisen ja eläinten 
vastakkainasettelua. Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on tutkia, millä tavoin teos käsittelee näitä 
asioita, ja selvittää voidaanko tarinaa pitää kannanottona lajien välisen tasa-arvon puolesta. 
Pyrin myös etsimään tekstistä esimerkkejä spesismistä eli lajisorrosta ja tarkastelemaan 
käsitelläänkö ilmiötä kriittisesti.  
 
Käytän tutkimuksen teoreettisena viitekehyksenä posthumanistista eläintutkimusta, jonka 
tavoitteena on luoda uudenlaista lajidiskurssia, joka pyrkii huomioimaan lajien välisen tasa-
arvon ja poistamaan ihmisen erityisaseman muihin lajeihin nähden. Koska posthumanismi on 
vielä melko tuore suuntaus, alalle ei ole vielä muodostunut selkeitä kirjallisuudentutkimuksen 
käytänteitä tai metodeja. Siksi yhdistän tutkielmani analyysiosuudessa posthumanistisen 
eläintutkimuksen teoriaa poststrukturalistisen kirjallisuudentutkimuksen metodeihin. Näiden 
filosofioiden yhdisteleminen on luontevaa, sillä posthumanismia ja poststrukturalismia 
yhdistää kriittisyys humanistisia filosofioita kohtaan sekä pyrkimys paljastaa ja 
dekonstruoida tekstin ihmiskeskeisyys. Analyysissa tarkastelen miten tarina kuvaa lajien 
välisiä suhteita yleisesti, miten tarinan ihmishahmot suhtautuvat eläimiin ja kuinka 
eläinhahmot itse näkevät asemansa suhteessa ihmiseen ja muihin eläinlajeihin. 
 
Tutkimuksessa selvisi, että kohdeteos ottaa kantaa lajien epätasa-arvoon kuvatessaan 
ihmisten ja eläinten välistä suhdetta sekä käsitellessään eläinten keskinäisiä suhteita. 
Erityisesti ihmisten tapoja omaksuneiden sikojen itsekeskeinen asenne ja syrjivä käytös muita 
eläimiä kohtaan oli helposti tulkittavissa spesismin kritiikiksi. Tarinan päättävä ihmisten ja 
sikojen yhteistyö puolestaan ottaa kantaa humanistiseen eläinoikeusajatteluun, jossa eläimen 
arvon määrittelee perinteisesti inhimillisinä pidetyt ominaisuudet, kuten älykkyys sekä 
lingvistiset ja kognitiiviset taidot. Posthumanistisesta näkökulmasta tarkasteltuna Animal 
Farm kommentoi kriittisesti humanististen filosofioiden ja perinteisen eläinoikeusaatteen 
ihmiskeskeisyyttä sekä siitä johtuvaa epäonnistumista aiemmissa yrityksissä parantaa eläinten 
asemaa yhteiskunnassa. Teosta aiemmin tutkineet kriitikot ovat harvoin huomioineet tekstissä 
esiintyviä eläinaiheita, mikä myös kertoo yhteiskunnassa vallitsevasta asenteesta eläimiä 
kohtaan.  
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1. Introduction 
George Orwell’s Animal Farm, originally published in 1945, is perhaps one of the best-
known animal stories ever written. It is a story of a small English farm where animals decide 
not to stand for their constant mistreatment by the farmer and take over the estate by 
expelling the humans. The animals of the eponymously renamed farm establish a new 
ideology called “Animalism” and agree on a set of rules by which their new community 
should live in order to create a utopia where all animals are equal and in control of their own 
lives. However, the pigs, being the most intelligent animals on the farm, are quickly allowed 
some self-assigned special privileges. As the rules are secretly altered by the pigs to better 
suit their preferences, the animals soon find themselves collaborating with their greatest 
enemy, the humans. 
There has been plenty of earlier research on Animal Farm, mainly on its obvious 
political symbolism. Given the time of its publication, the comparisons to communism and 
the Soviet Union are quite understandable. According to John Rossi, Orwell was among the 
first writers to identify that communism was a “dangerous form of totalitarianism” instead of 
simply a revolutionary power (207). The novel’s significance as a political satire is therefore 
undeniable. This thesis, however, focuses on themes and ideas that have usually been 
overlooked when interpreting the novel’s political symbolism. The thesis continues the work 
started in my bachelor thesis of the same name in 2014, parts of which have been used as 
such and parts have been rewritten. The aim of the research is to consider the different ways 
in which Animal Farm addresses the question of animal equality, and whether or not the story 
can be usefully viewed as a commentary on relations between species, using posthumanism 
as a theoretical point of view. Instead of reading the animals merely as an allegory for human 
social issues, I will address the animals as animals and focus on the relationships between 
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different species; not only between humans and animals, but also between the different 
nonhuman animal species.  
I will examine what kind of incidents of speciesism the text contains, if the incidents 
are committed by the characters, the narrator, or the text itself, and whether or not they are 
expressed critically. The starting point of the novel being the farm animals standing up to the 
humans who are supposed to care for them, I will also find out how the human/animal 
opposition is addressed in the novel. In a way, the story of Animal Farm develops into a 
direction that seems very posthumanist: humans are removed from the equation, as if to point 
out how we would react to the mistreatment of individuals – the farm animals in this case – if 
our attitudes were not affected by preconceived opinion about the human as species. 
Therefore, I also intend to consider if the novel contains other ideas that can be considered as 
posthumanist.  
It seems that animal fiction is almost never interpreted simply as stories about 
animals. Because animals cannot speak for themselves, it is tempting for humans to write and 
read animal characters in a way that makes sense from a human point of view, and not 
necessarily from the point of view of the animals, as Brian Boyd explains: 
because animals are mute, we can project ourselves onto them, and read our 
purposes in them. We can humanize them or moralize them, as in the fable and 
bestiary traditions (the industrious ant, the idle grasshopper). We turn them 
into metaphors, or nature does, because the gap of interspecies difference 
allows the charge of surprise at similarity that vivid metaphor requires. (228) 
Animal Farm too has been, almost without exception, studied from the point of view of satire 
and political allegory. This is peculiar since Animal Farm was released over seventy years 
ago, and the animal rights movement has a history of over forty years: Peter Singer’s Animal 
Liberation, often considered to be the philosophical foundation of the movement, was 
published already in 1975. Of course, the few decades of work on animal issues is nothing 
compared to the centuries of humanist tradition. Literary criticism tends, almost without 
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exception, to treat animals appearing in literary texts as a symbol for some human issue, such 
as ethnicity, gender, or social class (Wolfe, Animal Rites 124). Timothy Clark elaborates the 
problem: 
In most canonical literary texts, the place of non-human life is both pervasive 
but unseen. It is simply so uncontroversial as to make alternative readings 
centered on animals seem almost like a change of discipline. Any study of a 
text on the non-human always becomes a study of humanity in some sense. . . .  
At the same time, once the issue of animal exploitation is raised about a text, it 
immediately becomes obvious in ways that may leave little more to say. (187) 
This applies to Animal Farm as well. That is why this thesis addresses not only the treatment 
of animals physically but also the treatment of animals as a part of a literary narrative – that 
is, not simply the way the animals in the story are treated by other characters but also how the 
narrative itself presents the animals. Therefore, I also use the term animal equality henceforth 
to refer to the ethical treatment of animals instead of the commonly used term animal rights, 
unless when specifically referring to the humanist animal rights theories and the animal rights 
movement. 
As mentioned above, animals in canonical literary texts are often used to address 
other oppressed groups, such as women or ethnic minorities. Cary Wolfe considers this 
extremely problematic, because when the discourse of species is used to highlight the 
mistreatment of these social others, it automatically requires that we take for granted the 
“institution of speciesism” that entails that it is ethically acceptable to kill animals based on 
their species (Animal Rites 7). This means that if we interpret animals in anguish in a literary 
text as an analogue for a social other, we agree with the assumption that anguish in animals 
has no intrinsic value and it only becomes a matter of significance when used as a symbol for 
human suffering. Wolfe’s concern is not simply for animals, but for human others as well, 
because 
as long as this humanist and speciesist structure of subjectivization remains 
intact, and as long as it is institutionally taken for granted that it is all right to 
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systematically exploit and kill nonhuman animals simply because of their 
species, then the humanist discourse of species will always be available for 
use by some humans against other humans as well, to countenance violence 
against the social other of whatever species – or gender, or race, or class, or 
sexual difference. (Animal Rites 8) 
Therefore, to question the humanist theories and the discourse of species is very important, 
not just in terms of animal equality, but from a strictly human-related aspect as well.  
Although the meaning of Animal Farm is also commonly thought to be human rather 
than animal suffering, and the theme of the novel is linked to the totalitarianism of the Soviet 
Union, Orwell still manages to say a lot about animal issues as well, whether on purpose or 
accidentally, as I aim to show in my analysis. The relevance of this research is, therefore, the 
possibility to change the attitudes towards nonhuman beings in literature and consequently in 
real life as well. My aim is to encourage readers as well as researchers to question their own 
way of reading animals, and hopefully improve the status of nonhuman species as literary 
subjects, and consequently moral subjects as well. In Orwell and the Politics of Despair 
(1988), Alok Rai suggests that Orwell’s meanings are not hidden and “waiting to be 
discovered by the analysis of deep structures, of clusters of images and the mysterious 
intercourse of symbols” but that they “appear . . . emblazoned on the polished surfaces of his 
work” (4). In Rai’s opinion “the traditional tools of literary criticism were not . . . designed to 
deal with the obvious,” which is why, in studying Orwell, it is necessary to adjust the use of 
these methods of analysis to correspond with the “peculiar nature of the materials” (ibid.). I 
cannot think of a meaning less hidden in Animal Farm than the wellbeing of animals and the 
human-animal relationship, a meaning that is perhaps easily overlooked because it is so 
apparent. I argue that the surface story itself, combined with its intended allegorical meaning, 
has a substantial meaning, and by combining poststructuralist analysis and deconstruction 
with posthumanist animal studies I aim to explain the meaning and its significance.  
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2. Posthumanism and animal studies 
Animal studies is a relatively young field of academics. Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation, 
often considered to be the philosophical foundation of the animal rights movement, was 
published in 1975, having an important cultural effect both on a political and on an individual 
level, but it was not until Harriet Ritvo’s The Animal Estate: The English and Other 
Creatures in the Victorian Age (1987) that the “scholarly studies of animals” finally began 
(Palmieri 408). James Gorman wrote in the New York Times in January 2012 about different 
courses in the “growing, but still undefined, field of animal studies” that American 
universities had begun to offer their students. Thus, it seems, animal studies were not 
acknowledged enough to be taught in universities until well into the twenty-first century.  
According to Matthew Calarco (110), the reason why the animal question did not receive 
more attention in the latter part of the twentieth century is that other ethical questions, such as 
the holocaust, were of more interest to many great philosophers of the twentieth century, and 
the animal issues seemed unimportant in comparison. Also, because the field of animal 
studies “comprises a wide range of disciplines within the humanities, social sciences, and 
biological and cognitive sciences,” the field itself, its theoretical grounds, or its terminology 
have not yet been strictly defined in a way that is generally acknowledged (Calarco 2). 
However, at least two questions connect most of what is being done in animal studies at the 
moment: “One question concerns the being of animals, or ‘animality,’ and the other concerns 
the human-animal distinction” (ibid.). Both of these questions will of course be discussed in 
this thesis as well. 
Perhaps because animal studies is such a recent field, little research can be found on 
Animal Farm – or animal fiction in general – that would exclusively concentrate on the 
mistreatment of animals, an issue that is in no way covert in the novel, or the relationships 
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between different species. In fact, according to Clark, “apart from a few essays in scattered 
places, no literary movement with such modes of reading exists” (186). Literature is, 
however, a growing field of interest for animal studies, partly because it has been studied so 
little from this perspective, as Susan McHugh explains: 
As a field of knowledge arguably rooted in claims to have special access to 
textual interpretation, literary studies becomes a special target of concern for 
scholars in animal studies, in part because precious few literary critics have 
attempted to account systematically for the seemingly countless animal 
aspects of texts. (“Animal Farm’s Lessons” 32) 
Therefore, while it makes my research considerably more difficult, the animal point of view 
is an important way of reading a canonical novel, the animal characters of which have been 
dismissed in literary criticism for decades.  
Calarco argues that one of the reasons why the “increased violence toward animals 
has not been more of a question for thought in recent Continental philosophy” is that 
“Continental philosophers place a priority on concrete existential and ethicopolitical issues 
over abstract metaphysical and epistemological issues” and therefore “the Nazi Holocaust is a 
common and privileged referent for many of these thinkers” (110). To most philosophers 
discussion about human suffering might seem more interesting, more important, or perhaps 
more appropriate than discussion about animal suffering, and “giving even minor attention to 
the mistreatment of animals in this political and philosophical context might appear at first 
blush to be highly questionable, and to dare to equate or compare the Nazi Holocaust with the 
mistreatment of animals would seem to be even more questionable” (ibid.). Perhaps in the 
case of Animal Farm, the reason of dismissing the animal question may be similar: even 
considering the animal issues to have significance in relation to the controversy of Soviet 
totalitarianism may seem unthinkable to some critics.  
Although finding any animal-centered research on Animal Farm proved to be very 
difficult, McHugh (Animal Stories: Narrating Across Species Lines 182, henceforth referred 
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to as Animal Stories) notes that the more recent readings of Animal Farm do not merely focus 
on the political allegory but instead tend to acknowledge it as a story about animals. The 
origin story of the novel, explained by Orwell in “Preface to the Ukrainian Edition of Animal 
Farm,” would support the views that the novel contains ideas about human-animal 
relationships and not just political or social relationships: 
On my return from Spain I thought of exposing the Soviet myth in a story 
that could be easily understood by almost anyone and which could be easily 
translated into other languages. However, the actual details of the story did not 
come to me for some time until one day (I was then living in a small village) I 
saw a little boy, perhaps ten years old, driving a huge cart-horse along a 
narrow path, whipping it whenever it tried to turn. It struck me that if only 
such animals became aware of their strength we should have no power over 
them, and that men exploit animals in much the same way as the rich exploit 
the proletariat. 
I proceeded to analyse Marx's theory from the animals' point of view. To 
them it was clear that the concept of a class struggle between humans was pure 
illusion, since whenever it was necessary to exploit animals, all humans united 
against them: the true struggle is between animals and humans. From this 
point of departure, it was not difficult to elaborate the story. (405-406) 
(emphasis added) 
According to McHugh (Animal Stories 182), Raymond Williams was the first to consider the 
passage above to indicate that perhaps the story is not simply an analogy for Orwell’s 
personal feeling of disappointment in socialism but rather about exploitation in a much more 
general level, although he does point out that it would be difficult to argue that the real theme 
of Animal Farm is the “true struggle between animals and humans . . . without most of the 
surface of the story collapsing” (Williams 73). McHugh states that  Williams’ different 
perspective “leads the long, difficult shift away from reading Animal Farm strictly in terms of 
allegory” (Animal Stories 182). The commentary – and Animal Farm’s surface story in 
general – has still not been given the attention it should have, as Jeffrey M. Masson points 
out: “considering that Orwell’s small book is considered the greatest statement ever written 
about revolution, it is astonishing that Orwell’s own revolutionary comment about humans 
and animals has been effaced from the public record!” (qtd. in Tiffin 255). 
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Orwell’s observation shows that he was aware of the problematic relationship 
between human and nonhuman beings when writing Animal Farm, and the novel itself proves 
that he reflected on the matter even further. Orwell’s ideas about the subject are not entirely 
theoretical either. Alex Zwerdling argues that Animal Farm “could only have been written by 
someone who had observed life on a farm and how animals behave very closely” (qtd. in 
Firchow 98), and Orwell did indeed have some first-hand experience about raising animals 
(ibid. 100). According to Margaret Drabble (40) “Orwell was on the whole fond of animals 
and had far more day-to-day dealings with them throughout his life than many writers have 
had.” Also, the first poem Orwell ever wrote, at the age of four or five, “was about a tiger and 
owed much, he says, to William Blake, that pioneer defender of animal rights” (ibid.). 
Orwell’s fondness of animals as well as his admiration of William Blake suggest that animal 
issues would have been important to him, which is why it does not seem impossible to find 
ideas supporting animal equality in his work. 
The theoretical framework of this thesis is posthumanism, based mainly on two works 
of Cary Wolfe: What is Posthumanism? (2009) and Animal Rites: American Culture, the 
Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist Theory (2003). Posthumanism is quite a broad and 
diverse theory with different aspects to it. Therefore, in order to define the scope of my 
research, I have chosen these two books by Wolfe as my main theoretical references. In 
addition, one of the main influences on Wolfe’s work seems to be Jacques Derrida’s 
poststructuralist theory, which, according to Wolfe (Animal Rites 54), “is widely held to be 
nothing if not posthumanist or at least antihumanist.” Derrida himself explains in “The 
Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)” (henceforth referred to as “The Animal”) 
that as long as he has been writing he has “sought to dedicate to the question of the living and 
of the living animal,” which, for him, “will always have been the most important and decisive 
question” (402). According to Calarco (139), Derrida “is concerned throughout all of his texts 
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on this issue to disrupt metaphysical discourses about animals that treat each singular animal 
as an instance of ‘The Animal,’ a homogeneous, essentialist, and reductive category that 
presumes that there is something in common shared by (or lacking in) all beings labeled 
‘animal’” (139). Thus, Derrida’s concern of nonhuman beings is not restricted to literary 
representations, but to all aspects of the animal question, although all aspects of the problem 
stem from the same root: 
It is all too evident that in the course of the last two centuries these traditional 
forms of treatment of the animal have been turned upside down by the joint 
developments of zoological, ethological, biological, and genetic forms of 
knowledge and the always inseparable techniques of intervention with respect 
to their object, the transformation of the actual object, its milieu, its world, 
namely, the living animal. This has occurred by means of farming and 
regimentalization at a demographic level unknown in the past, by means of 
genetic experimentation, the industrialization of what can be called the 
production for consumption of animal meat, artificial insemination on a 
massive scale, more and more audacious manipulations of the genome, the 
reduction of the animal not only to production and over-active reproduction 
(hormones, genetic crossbreeding, cloning, and so on) of meat for 
consumption but also of all sorts of other end products, and all of that in the 
service of a certain being and the so-called human well-being of man. (“The 
Animal” 394) 
The developments for example in farming and meat industry, which Derrida mentions above, 
and their impact on the treatment of animals comes up in my analysis of Animal Farm, and 
because of his significance for the animal studies, as well as literary studies in general, I will 
also be discussing Derrida’s other ideas and the influence they have had on posthumanism 
and the discussion on animal equality. 
 
2.1 What is posthumanism? 
As an idea, posthumanism can be dated back as far as the late 1940s or early 1950s, when the 
interdisciplinary systems theory was developed, although the term “posthumanism” has only 
been used since the mid-1990s (Wolfe, What is Posthumanism? xii). The term posthumanism 
has several meanings, some of them having quite different priorities. Most relevant to this 
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thesis, Wolfe (What is Posthumanism? xvi-xvii) defines posthumanism as criticism of the 
humanist philosophies that emphasize humanity and the essence of human. He does not want 
to entirely abandon humanism – the ethical system centered on humans – but to point out 
how the philosophy and ethics of humanist theories restrain some quite admirable ideas and 
visions of humanism. It is the anthropocentrism of the humanist discourses that 
posthumanism criticizes and aims to change. For example, posthumanism does not agree with 
romanticism’s idea of “some original human nature suppressed by the artificial, from which it 
must be retrieved” and instead suggests that what defines human beings is “a general mix of 
malleability and resistance, together producing differing effects of disposition and capability 
according to context and condition” (Clark 66). Thus, humans are going through a constant 
process of adaptation and change that depends on their surroundings. According to Clark 
(ibid.), “it is increasingly recognised that this is the status also of many non-human species, 
so blurring not only the distinction of human and mechanical but of human and animal.”  
One of the most prevalent ideas often related to and often confused with 
posthumanism is the concept of transhumanism. Making a distinction between the two is 
important since their aims do not correspond with each other. The aim of transhumanism is 
for humans to advance – with the help of modern technologies – in intelligence, as well as 
physical and emotional abilities, and have a generally longer lifespan, free from disease and 
other unnecessary suffering (Wolfe, What is Posthumanism? xiii). Wolfe (ibid. xv) in fact 
refers to transhumanism as “intensification of humanism”, meaning that it attempts to detach 
“the human” from “not just its animal origins in nature, the biological, and the evolutionary” 
but from material and physical bonds as well. His own idea of posthumanism is basically the 
opposite: it entails the idea that human beings are deeply embedded in both the biological and 
the technological world – technological referring here to even the most basic implements, 
such as tools and language, that have evolved alongside human beings even before they have 
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become what we now understand as human – and that it is precisely the highly developed 
“technical, medical, informatic, and economical networks” that have now made it difficult to 
deny the need to shift from out-of-date anthropocentric views to “a new mode of thought that 
comes after the cultural repressions and fantasies, the philosophical protocols and evasions, 
of humanism as a historically specific phenomenon” (Wolfe, What is Posthumanism? xv-
xvi). Therefore, our understanding of the lives of animals, and how they are abused, is the 
result of the very humanism that has earlier justified that abuse.  
Although the strand of posthumanism that Wolfe represents shares many of the 
concerns and the ideas of the advocates of the animal rights movement, it also finds them 
flawed. According to Wolfe (Animal Rites 8), the problem with traditional animal rights 
philosophies, represented most famously by the utilitarian Peter Singer, author of Animal 
Liberation (1975), and the neo-Kantian Tom Regan, author of The Case for Animal Rights 
(1983), is that they approach the issue from a strictly humanist – that is human-oriented – 
point of view. In fact, Calarco (8) describes Regan’s work not as “a case for animal rights but 
for rights for subjects, the classical example of which is human beings. And inasmuch as 
animals manifest morally relevant human, or subjectlike, traits, they are brought under the 
scope of moral consideration.” In other words, the humanist theories of animal rights rely 
mainly on presuppositions that humans possess particular attributes – such as the ability to 
suffer, experience subjectivity, or have moral worth – and aim to establish that animals 
possess these attributes too, thereby justifying why animals should be granted certain basic 
rights as well (Clark 187). Because “moral philosophy functions, by and large, within an 
implicit anthropocentric, subject-centered model,” the animal rights theorists have had to 
depend on the language and demands of that model “in order to make a case that can gain a 
hearing within [the] model” (Calarco 9). The problem is that because it is actually that very 
same anthropocentric “moral model, language, and demands that have been used to deny 
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animals basic moral standing for centuries,” the animal rights theorists have managed “to 
include only certain animals within that scope and to draw only a new, slightly different 
exclusionary boundary” and “a slightly different version of anthropocentrism and subject-
centrism” (ibid.).  
As explained above, instead of trying to extend human subjectivity to animals, 
posthumanism strives to expose anthropocentrism in the current species discourse and to 
address animal issues from a different point of view. One of its aims is to question the whole 
concept of human in the based on the fact that there are unambiguous differences between 
what is considered human and what is considered animal (Clark 187). As “the traditionally 
distinctive marks of the human (first it was possession of a soul, then ‘reason,’ then tool use, 
then tool making, then altruism, then language, then the production of linguistic novelty, and 
so on) flourish quite reliably beyond the species barrier” (Wolfe, Animal Rites 2) it makes 
sense to question, as Jouni Teittinen (159) does, whether any remaining dissimilarities 
between human and other species can function as actual proof of a legitimate distinction or 
simply as an attempt to justify a preconceived idea of a categorical difference.  
 
2.2 Poststructuralism and binary oppositions 
As mentioned earlier, posthumanism owes a lot to poststructuralism and that is why many of 
the methods of analysis used in this thesis come from poststructuralism. While 
poststructuralism suggests that we can understand the world through language, it also realizes 
that because we take language for granted, the meanings that we assume words hold are 
merely subjective understandings of the meanings of those words (Bertens 105-106). This 
means that the meanings given to a particular word can hold a negative meaning without us 
even realizing it. A word we use, the signifier, is not in any way controlled by what they refer 
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to, the signified, but it is able to refer to the signified because of difference from other words; 
the meanings of words are connected to meanings of other words, including their opposites 
(Bertens 108). In “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” 
(henceforth referred to as “Structure, Sign, and Play”) Derrida states that “the central 
signified . . . is never absolutely present outside a system of differences” (354). Thus, the 
signifier remains the same while the signified changes constantly. The meanings of words 
result from differance, which means that words differ from other words as well as defer to the 
meanings of other words. Therefore, we can never assign one definite meaning to a word 
because all the past meanings affect that word as well. This constant uncertainty and change 
of meanings also results in the fact that there is no absolute presence, something that we can 
know for sure outside of language. As Derrida  explains (Of Grammatology 166), "Speech 
and the consciousness of speech − that is to say consciousness simply as self-presence − are 
the phenomenon of an auto-affection lived as the suppression of differance. That 
phenomenon, that presumed suppression of differance, that lived reduction of the opacity of 
the signifier, are the origin of what is called presence.” In other words, although we might 
think that the ideas we want to express are present to us before we even think about putting 
them into words, that they are not affected by differance, those ideas do not in fact exist 
outside of language (Bertens 107). We perceive the presence, that the ideas have absolute 
meanings, because we assume that we can suppress the differance of language. The absence 
of presence also suggests that there can be no essential meanings, which will be discussed in 
the following section.  
As explained above, language can steer our thinking into a certain direction because 
even single words may contain meanings that we do not necessarily realize. Those hidden 
meanings of the signifiers, derived from their relationships to other signifiers, may give 
negative or positive connotations also to the signified. From a posthumanist point of view, the 
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whole discourse of species is problematic regarding animal equality precisely because of 
connotations that are attached to certain terms. According to Clark  (185-86), the terminology 
used when addressing the relationship between humans and animals is often misleading: the 
two are placed on a scale where “the human” is on one end and “the animal” on the other, the 
latter term – in singular form – representing the whole variety of different nonhuman animals. 
Binary oppositions such as this animal/human relation – other such oppositions could be, for 
example, good/evil, masculine/feminine, and white/black – are often used to explain texts, 
while one of these terms is always seen as privileged, having a sort of naturally defined status 
(Bertens 112-13). Because of this assumption the oppositions can reinforce negative 
phenomena such as discrimination, social inequity, and repression (ibid.). Posthumanism 
argues that the opposition of human/animal, in which “human” is the privileged term, is 
falsely seen as natural because of the species discourse used to discuss the issues. This is an 
example of posthumanism utilizing poststructuralism, trying to deconstruct the opposition of 
human/animal, where one is preferred over the other.  
Instead of comparing the similarities of different species, as the humanist animal 
rights theory often does, Derrida approaches the human/animal opposition by explaining the 
vast differences of different species: 
Beyond the edge of the so-called human, beyond it but by no means on a 
single opposing side, rather than "the Animal" or "Animal Life," there is 
already a heterogeneous multiplicity of the living, or more precisely (since to 
say "the living" is already to say too much or not enough) a multiplicity of 
organizations of relations between living and dead, relations of organization or 
lack of organization among realms that are more and more difficult to 
dissociate by means of the figures of the organic and inorganic, of life and/or 
death. These relations are at once close and abyssal, and they can never be 
totally objectified. They do not leave room for any simple exteriority of one 
term with respect to another. (“The Animal” 399). 
This, according to Calarco, denies “the possibility of making any kind of clean distinction 
between human and animal, not only because of the irreducible plurality of beings but also 
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because of the multiplicity of becomings and relational structures between human and 
animal” (142). He explains that “If what we call ‘animal life’ is constituted by a 
‘heterogeneous multiplicity’ of entities and a ‘multiplicity of organizations of relations’ 
between organic and inorganic life forms,” then there is no sense in an “insuperable division 
between human and animal” since human beings also “belong to this multiplicity of beings 
and relations” (ibid.). Animals can therefore not be treated as simply a homogenous 
nonhuman mass, and human beings and nonhuman animals should not be treated two distinct 
groups in a binary opposition but as a heterogeneous “community of animals” (Clark 186). 
However, deconstruction is not meant to deny a difference between two concepts (Culler 87) 
but rather to expose the bias towards one concept over the other. According to Derrida 
(“Positions” 36) “in a classical philosophical opposition we are not dealing with the peaceful 
coexistence of a vis-à-vis, but with a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms controls the 
other (axiologically, logically, etc.), holds the superior position. To deconstruct the 
opposition is first, at a given moment, to overthrow the hierarchy.” In order to neutralize the 
opposition we must first turn the opposition around, and because “the hierarchy of the dual 
opposition always reconstitutes itself,” this task of inversion should not be forgotten at any 
point of the analysis (ibid.). In my analysis I present examples of human/animal oppositions 
found in the novel attempt to overthrow the hierarchy by discussing what kind of assumptions 
and connotations those oppositions hold. 
 
2.3 Speciesism and essentialism 
One of the key terms related to animal equality – in posthumanism as well as in humanist 
animal rights theories – is that of speciesism. According to Peter Singer’s definition, 
speciesism is “a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of one’s 
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own species and against those of members of other species” (6). As an example, Singer (qtd. 
in Wolfe, Animal Rites 34) points out the hypocrisy of using chimpanzees as test subjects in 
medical research, exposing them to pain and suffering and forcing them to live in captivity, 
whereas treating a mentally handicapped person with an even lower mental capacity the same 
way would be unthinkable. Here the basis for moral subjectivity is not a higher level of 
consciousness, an ability to communicate or feel pain, but simply the membership of a 
biological species. According to Singer “It should be obvious that the fundamental objections 
to racism and sexism . . . apply equally to speciesism. If possessing a higher degree of 
intelligence does not entitle one human to use another for his or her own ends, how can it 
entitle humans to exploit nonhumans for the same purpose?” (6). Moral worth cannot be 
based on a biological factor such as species, just as it cannot be based on race or gender.  
The basis for moral subjectivity should therefore be something else than merely the 
biological species.  
There are of course differing views across the field of animal studies. For example, 
Singer (19) admits that killing a healthy human can be considered worse than killing a mouse 
on grounds of several criteria but states that none of those criteria follow strictly the bounds 
of species. Posthumanism, on the other hand, seems to suggest that since it is practically 
impossible to define where to draw the line for when killing is acceptable and when it is not, 
no such line should be drawn. Although the issue is not unproblematic, it is a poor excuse to 
rely on the humanist ideology that allows cruelty to nonhuman beings. The problem that 
speciesism creates is that when members of other species are primarily considered as “other 
than human”, that is, based on what they are not, instead of what or who they actually are, 
people see and consequently treat other species not as individuals but as a single mass, as 
what Derrida refers to as “the Animal” (“The Animal” 399). However, “Among nonhumans 
and separate from nonhumans there is an immense multiplicity of other living things that 
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cannot in any way be homogenized, except by means of violence and willful ignorance, 
within the category of what is called the animal or animality in general” (ibid. 416) 
(emphasis added). 
In addition to the label of animality, we also have to look at the label of humanity, as 
in that what makes one human. The way classical humanism perceives human beings is that 
we have some kind of invariable quality within us that makes us human, usually called 
human nature or human essence. This essentialism – one of the main criticisms of 
poststructuralism (Bertens 103) – is one of the main causes of speciesist thinking. In terms of 
speciesism, humanism has two sides: “an inclusive side, according to which all humans are 
first-class moral patients, and an exclusive side, according to which only humans are first-
class moral patients” (Cavalieri 70). However, as explained above, a biological species is not 
a valid ground for moral subjectivity. Some humanist theories admit this but still demand that 
there is some definite attribute that humans possess which gives moral subjectivity to humans 
but not to animals. There are, however, people living in isolated areas whose moral 
community may not reach further than their own tribe or village (ibid.). If these people do not 
account us as members of their moral community, then do they not consider us as human? 
And should we not nonetheless consider them as human? According to Wolfe  
the humanist concept of subjectivity is inseparable from the discourse and 
institution of speciesism, which relies on the tacit acceptance . . . that the full 
transcendence of the ‘human’ requires the sacrifice of the ‘animal’ and the 
animalistic, which in turn makes possible a symbolic economy in which we 
can engage in a ‘noncriminal putting to death’ (as Derrida puts it) not only of 
animals, but other humans as well by marking them as animal. (Animal Rites 
43) 
What Wolfe is saying is that if we accept there to be a certain transcendent quality of human 
that gives us our moral worth, there will always be people who will deny other people, as 
well as animals, their moral worth on the basis that they do not possess that quality. For 
example, in the past the Western tradition – on which the humanist ethics are based – has 
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justified phenomena such as slavery and the crusades on the basis that the people involved, 
who were killed, oppressed, and exploited, were not classified as human (Spivak 229). Thus, 
ethics based on what is essentially human can result in serious incidents of speciesism and 
other kinds of discrimination.  
As mentioned above, the vast variety of nonhuman beings cannot all be grouped into 
a single homogenous “category of what is called the animal or animality in general” (Derrida, 
“The Animal” 416), meaning that there is no animal essence. Derrida also debunks the idea 
of human essence by explaining that human could not exist without an other, in this case 
animal, basing his arguments on language, not surprisingly. According to Derrida language is 
a field of “infinite substitutions,” not because it is so large, but because “there is something 
missing from it: a center which arrests and grounds the play of substitutions” (“Structure, 
Sign and Play” 365). Defining the center is impossible “because the sign which replaces the 
center, which supplements it, taking the center’s place in its absence – this sign is added, 
occurs as a surplus, as a supplement” (ibid.). Thus, the signification given to a language 
structure not only supplements the center by replacing it but also supplements the structure in 
the sense that it adds something new to it (ibid. 365-66). This effect of supplementarity is also 
what “makes possible all that constitutes the property of man: speech, society, passion, etc.” 
(Derrida, Of Grammatology 244). However, “supplementarity, which is nothing, neither a 
presence nor an absence, is neither a substance nor an essence of man” (ibid.). Therefore 
“Man calls himself man only by drawing limits excluding his other from the play of 
supplementarity: the purity of nature, of animality, primitivism, childhood, madness, 
divinity” (ibid.). In other words, “the term ‘human’ gains sense only in relation to a series of 
excluded terms and identities, foremost among them nature and animality” (Calarco 104). In 
Wolfe’s opinion  Derrida’s ideas may not be very useful in creating new practical policies for 
animal welfare but they are “of immense use in forcing us to live with the fact that no matter 
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how such policies are drawn, the distinction between human and animal should be of no use 
in drawing them” (What Is Posthumanism? 98). The importance of language for the case of 
animal equality will be discussed further in the following section. The question of 
essentialism, on the other hand, will be discussed in the analysis section within the context of 
the novel.  
 
2.4 Animals and language 
One of the major themes in Animal Farm is language, which the pigs take advantage of on 
several occasions in order to make the other animals subject to their will (Lee 122-23). The 
theme of language is important in regards to animal issues and consequently to my research 
for two reasons. First, language and its varied degrees of complexity is often considered to be 
what differentiates humans from animals, which is of course relevant to my research from the 
perspective of the human-animal opposition. According to Derrida, philosophers from 
Aristotle to the likes of Lacan, Descartes, Kant, Heidegger, and Levinas  
all of them say the same thing: the animal is without language. Or more 
precisely unable to respond, to respond with a response that could be precisely 
and rigorously distinguished from a reaction, the animal is without the right 
and power to ‘respond’ and hence without many other things that would be the 
property of man. (“The Animal” 400) 
The animals’ inability to “respond” is thus a popular argument used to deny animals of their 
moral subjectivity. For example, Luc Ferry (qtd. in Wolfe, Animal Rites 38), criticizes the 
animal rights ideology and its accusations of speciesism by proposing that ethics are based on 
a contractarian model, which suggests that an ethical contract protects those who are able to 
understand and agree with the contract out of their free will, the protection being transitive to 
some – such as small children – who are unable to understand the contract. According to 
Ferry (ibid.), animals are not protected by the contract – being unable to understand it – but 
instead humans have an indirect obligation towards animals, out of politeness, to treat them 
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with “certain respect,” and failing to fulfill this obligation may cause human beings to lose 
their humanity. The problem with the contractarian approach is of course – besides being 
based on dogmatic rather than theoretical grounds (Clark 189) – that it is not much comfort to 
those who are not able to sign the contract, such as animals in this case. If the animals do not 
have the possibility to agree nor disagree – to respond – with the contract, then is it justified 
to deny them of all rights? Tom Regan (17) points out, as an example, that by the 
contractarian logic the apartheid would have been acceptable as long as not too many white 
South Africans had been upset by it. In the case of animals the problem of course relates to 
language: as they do not share the language that would allow them to enter the contract, they 
are unable to gain moral subjectivity. It seems illogical that we should be able deny moral 
subjectivity from another being based on a contract that we have devised and that the other 
being cannot understand. 
Language also brings us back to the question of human essence discussed in the 
previous section. A language barrier between humans and other species seems obvious and 
many humanists, such as the philosophers mentioned above, wish to use that barrier as a 
dividing factor between humans and animals: humans are supposedly human because they 
have a kind of language that no other species has. However, Wolfe points out that 
it is not simply a question of ‘giving language back to the animal,’ but rather 
of showing how the difference in kind between human and animal that 
humanism constitutes on the site of language may instead be thought as 
difference in degree on a continuum of signifying processes disseminated in 
field of materiality, technicity, and contingency, of which ‘human’ ‘language’ 
is but a specific (albeit highly refined) instance. (Animal Rites 79) 
Therefore, according to Clark, “Human language is only one of a vast network of signifying 
possibilities across innumerable species” and “Human subjectivity and language are possible 
only on the basis of deeper structures of signification and communication that have nothing 
exclusively human about them” (53). While it differs from the communication of other 
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species in degree, human language is not unique in the sense that it would justify the human-
animal division, nor is it something that other species should master in order to be taken 
seriously as moral subjects by humans. Because members of different species have different 
capacities for attributes such as language, senses of smell and hearing, or kinesthesia, 
“human-animal relations cannot be regarded as incomplete versions of human-human 
relations but must be regarded as complete versions of relations between different kinds of 
animals” (Patton 97). Similarly, in my view, human-animal communication cannot be 
approached with the attitude that animals use some kind of imperfect version of human 
language, that human language is a default value against which all other communication 
should be compared, and that human language is a goal towards which other species should 
aspire in order to gain a status human – or at least human-like – beings. After all, human 
language is a concept that has been developed by humans and given to humans by humans 
themselves, while denying it to other beings, as Derrida points out: 
It is less a matter of asking whether one has the right to refuse the animal such 
and such a power (speech, reason, experience of death, mourning, culture, 
institution, technics, clothing, lie, pretense of pretense, covering of tracks, gift, 
laughter, tears, and so on – the list is necessarily without limit, and the most 
powerful philosophical tradition within which we live has refused the ‘animal’ 
of all those things) than of asking whether what calls itself human has the right 
to rigorously attribute to man, which means therefore to attribute to himself, 
what he refuses the animal, and whether he can ever possess the pure, 
rigorous, indivisible concept, as such, of that attribution. (“And Say the 
Animal Responded?” 137-38) 
Derrida’s approach in deconstructing the opposition of human/animal is thus not about 
proving that animals possess certain attributes but rather questioning whether humans do 
either. 
The second reason why language is important for animal issues is that, as 
posthumanism and poststructuralism suggest, discrimination and partiality are in fact caused 
by language, or more precisely the discourses we use. Orwell himself states that “if thought 
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corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought” (“Politics and the English Language” 
137). Orwell’s interest in language has been clearly acknowledged in earlier research. 
According to Lee, what Orwell is trying to say with Animal Farm is that a “society which 
cannot control its language is . . . doomed to be oppressed in terms which deny it the very 
most elemental aspects of humanity” and that “those who control the means of 
communication have the most awful of powers – they literally can create the truth they 
choose” (127). A similar idea appears in Orwell’s other famous novel, the dystopian Nineteen 
Eighty-Four (1949), where an artificial language of the totalitarian state of Oceania called 
“Newspeak” is lacking any words that might be used to generate ideas against the state itself 
or its political ideology Ingsoc, as explained by Orwell himself: 
The purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a medium of expression for 
the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees of Ingsoc, but to 
make all other modes of thought impossible. It was intended that when 
Newspeak had been adopted once and for all and Oldspeak forgotten, a 
heretical thought – that is, a thought diverging from the principles of Ingsoc – 
should be literally unthinkable, at least so far as thought is dependent on 
words. (“The Principles of Newspeak” 312) 
The assumption is that one cannot come up with revolutionary ideas if one has no words for 
such ideas.  
In “Politics and the English Language” Orwell expresses his worry about the state of 
English language – in the mid-1940s when the essay was written – but also his belief that 
something can be done about the matter: 
I said earlier that the decadence of our language is probably curable. Those 
who deny this would argue, if they produced an argument at all, that language 
merely reflects existing social conditions, and that we cannot influence its 
development by any direct tinkering with words and constructions. So far as 
the general tone or spirit of a language goes, this may be true, but it is not true 
in detail. Silly words and expressions have often disappeared, not through any 
evolutionary process but owing to the conscious action of a minority. (137-38) 
(emphasis added) 
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Orwell’s concerns are mainly aesthetical but the idea that language change is not 
uncontrollable, that it can happen through a conscious effort, is important for the endeavor of 
moving towards a less biased species discourse. For example, Orwell (ibid. 139) advises 
against using dead metaphors, which could also include many speciesist expressions, such as 
insulting someone by calling them a rat or a pig, or describing a cruel human individual as an 
animal. Orwell’s purposes might not be the same as those of the posthumanists but the 
violation of using a phrase or a metaphor out of a habit without actually thinking what kind of 
meaning it actually holds is the same in both cases. His understanding of the importance of 
language and his faith in our ability to develop it reminds me of Clark’s view: 
We cannot choose to step out of language and somehow orient ourselves in the 
world without it – how in any case would such an experience be conveyed to 
others? Language is, rather, a kind of decisive environment out of which we 
define ourselves. This is an environment that, especially in the West, expresses 
the overwhelming and often oppressive weight of centuries of anthropocentric 
modes of thought and perception but that still contains hidden resources and 
inventive possibilities for those writers and thinkers able to discern and 
exploit them. (54) (emphasis added) 
Language is clearly a factor that relates closely to Animal Farm and Orwell did consider the 
power that language can have in his other work as well. In the analysis section I will discuss 
different ways in which the pigs in Animal Farm use language in oppressing the other 
animals and creating an unequal relationship between the different species. 
 
3. Allegory 
It has already been established that Animal Farm is widely acknowledged to be an allegory of 
the Russian Revolution and the failure of communism. Before the actual analysis of the 
novel, it is useful to address some general ideas of what is meant by allegory in order to 
recognize the different levels of meaning in an allegorical text and to understand why the 
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most obvious interpretation is not necessarily the only possible or relevant meaning that the 
novel contains. 
According to a general understanding “the term allegory refers to a way of saying or 
showing one thing and meaning another” (Machosky 1) and usually when interpreting an 
allegory there is a conscious effort to separate what is said and what the text actually means 
(ibid. 17). However, the definition is simplified and imperfect and this way of reading an 
allegory is quite a conventional one. Such conventional ways of reading have been addressed 
among others by Paul de Man, a poststructuralist like Derrida. De Man comments on the shift 
of focus from form to reference in literary criticism during the twentieth century by noting 
that “The polarities of inside and outside have been reversed, but they are still the same 
polarities that are at play: internal meaning has become outside reference, and the outer form 
has become the intrinsic structure” (4). Thus, according to de Man (5), whether the focus is 
on the form or on the reference, most literary criticism tends to view literature as a box that 
needs to be opened by a reader or a critic in order to set free the hidden contents of the box. 
According to the box metaphor, the meaning of a text is either considered to be within the 
text, in its form, with no outside reference, or outside the text, in the references it makes for 
example to the surrounding culture or the author himself. De Man (5) questions the way 
interpretation is generally perceived and the way that the meaning of a text can supposedly 
be understood only through this inside/outside metaphor. The polarity of the two terms gives 
the impression that the actual meaning of an allegorical text is completely separate from its 
literal meaning, as if the two are complete opposites, and this opposition needs to be 
challenged (ibid.). 
Derrida’s ideas also appear in discussions of allegory. According to Maureen 
Quilligan, “The ‘other’ named by the term allos in the word ‘allegory’ is not some other 
hovering above the words of the text, but the possibility of an otherness, a polysemy, inherent 
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in the very words on the page; allegory therefore names the fact that language can signify 
many things at once” (qtd. in Machosky 18). The ‘other’ in allegory is therefore clearly 
connected to the concept of differance (Hunter 162). Deconstruction is also essential to 
reading allegory, but Machosky emphasizes that it is not merely a method that is 
systematically “applied to some object” (16). Instead she sees deconstruction as “an 
allegorical mode of reading, a way of reading the gaps that naturally occur in language, gaps 
that cannot be avoided, no matter how carefully something is written” (ibid.). It is also 
important to acknowledge that allegory, unlike many other methods of writing and 
interpreting literature, accepts that these gaps exist (ibid.). Therefore, claiming an allegorical 
text to have one true meaning is unfounded. Also, reading texts as allegories does not have 
any straightforward strategies or techniques. As Lynette Hunter explains, allegory is 
grounded on “interaction rather than imposition,” which is why “specific definitions and 
enumerated theories are difficult to provide” (164).  
 
3.1 The allegories in Animal Farm 
Although the aim of this research is to focus on the animal issues in the novel that have 
usually been left unaddressed, the point is not to deny that Animal Farm has allegorical 
meanings. The novel is clearly not just a story about farm animals but of something of a 
much larger scale. However, alternative readings of the novel should be welcomed, because if 
we continue to read Animal Farm “as George Orwell’s allegory of Stalin’s USSR, then the 
animals as animals disappear from view and are replaced by the humans they symbolize,” 
and a reading of this kind gives “the reason for the fulsome list ‘explaining’ what each 
allegorical animal stands for . . .” (Fudge 13). Such a list is provided, among others, by 
Elaheh Fadaee (23-25) who itemizes most of the characters and many events of the novel, 
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explaining the human equivalents that each character or event has, as does Jeffrey Meyers 
(135-36). John Rodden also lists correspondence between the novel and real events, 
expressing his concern that “If a reader misses such allegorical correspondences, he or she 
may completely misread the book” (72). Rodden’s concern is of course not completely 
unproblematic, because as Erica Fudge points out, while these lists make it much easier to 
teach the novel, they also make void “the possibility of reading it as having anything to say 
about human-animal relations” (13). Although it seems that to read Animal Farm as having 
only its literal meaning is perhaps considered foolish by many scholars, it is also important to 
acknowledge that Animal Farm may contain more allegories than the one that is generally 
considered to be the “true meaning” of the novel. Whether or not the reader acknowledges the 
similarities between the events and characters in the book and events and characters in real 
life, he or she can still find the story to hold legit meanings – literal or allegorical – that are 
not tied strictly to the events of the Soviet Union. In fact, Rodden (73) does see Animal Farm 
as working on different levels of allegory. Although referring to it as “a children’s story” – as 
a lot of animal fiction seems often to be labeled – he admits that “As an animal story, the 
work invites the reader to respond compassionately to the sufferings of vulnerable beasts” 
and that “readers identify with the suffering and oppression of the poor animals” (ibid.). This 
recognition of the reader’s ability to sympathize and identify with suffering animals is an 
important one, but once we replace the animals with humans that they supposedly symbolize 
we often make the assumption that we are actually meant to sympathize and identify with the 
human correspondents instead of the animal characters. As Fudge points out, “an allegorical 
reading that interprets [an animal] as always symbolising something else silences the 
presence of [that animal] as the suffering center of the story” (13), and this is what Rodden 
quickly moves towards in his analysis: 
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Beyond an explicit, literal level, then, are three symbolic levels on 
which Animal Farm operates. First, it is a historical satire of the Russian 
Revolution and the subsequent Soviet dictatorship, in which the precision of 
Orwell's allegory covers exact historical correspondences between the events 
of Animal Farm and Soviet history up to 1943. 
Second, Animal Farm is a political treatise that suggests larger lessons 
about power, tyranny, and revolution in general. On this level, Orwell's book 
has a much broader historical and political message, one that is not limited to 
criticism of the Soviet Union. (73) 
The first level is perhaps the most commonly understood one, which I have already pointed 
out several times during the thesis, and it needs no further scrutiny at this point. The second 
level, however, is a much more relevant one in regard to the animal question. If, as Rodden 
suggests, the story is about power relations and tyranny in general, there is no reason why its 
message should be limited to human-human relations alone. Although many critics seem to 
insist this is not the case, a story that features animals as its main characters can in fact 
address the animal question beyond the literal meaning, as I will explain in the analysis 
section. 
 The final level of symbolic meaning that Rodden presents is perhaps the most 
problematic in relation to animals: 
Third, Animal Farm is a fable, or a ‘fairy tale,’ as Orwell termed it. It carries a 
universal moral about the ‘animality’ of human nature. For instance, by the 
conclusion of Animal Farm, some of the pigs are walking upright and wearing 
human clothes: they are little different from corrupt human beings. Animal 
Farm mirrors our human world, which is sometimes referred to as ‘the human 
circus’ because the various types of human personality can be compared to the 
character types of animals. Some humans are like pigs, others resemble sheep, 
still others can be compared to dogs, and so forth. On this level, Orwell's 
‘fable’ about human nature transcends both history and particular political 
events. We see how the fundamental characters of animals do not change. The 
animals behave consistently, whether in a noble or selfish spirit, through all 
the changes in the story from the feudal, aristocratic, conservative farm run by 
Mr. Jones to the modern, progressive, radical ‘animal farm’ ruled by 
Napoleon. (73) 
In Rodden’s analysis, which is very much in line with the general view of the meaning of 
Animal Farm, mostly negative traits are mirrored in the stereotypical behavior of the animal 
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characters. If similar negative stereotyping was used with characters of different gender or 
ethnicity, it would be considered extremely offensive, but with animals we accept the 
stereotypes much more willingly. Doing this we deny the different species of having the 
capacity for diversity of character and capabilities. 
The negative stereotypes and the different characteristic human types portrayed in 
animal characters are clear, although quite simplified, examples of anthropomorphism, and 
based on the earlier work done on Animal Farm – articles about political symbolism and 
critique of communism in the novel – it is obvious that the novel is considered to contain 
many such examples. Anthropomorphism is defined by The Hutchinson Dictionary of Ideas 
(2005) as “the attribution of human characteristics to animals, inanimate objects, or deities” 
and it is often used as a “literary device in fables and allegories.” Interpreted as simplified 
allegories, anthropomorphism is directly related to the problem presented in the introduction: 
animals in literature hardly ever represent animal issues. Clark also points out that to report 
something as “anthropomorphic” requires assumptions of what actually is human – 
assumptions that certain attributes, whether or not they are ascribed to other beings, are 
unquestionably human attributes (194). Since “All human knowledge is anthropomorphic in 
some way”, it is actually difficult to even determine where anthropomorphism begins and 
ends (ibid.). For example, if a text describes a nonhuman animal going through a thought 
process or having feelings of affection or fear, and we label this as anthropomorphism, we are 
then making the assumption that those thoughts or feelings are definitely attributes of human 
beings only, most likely without knowing whether the animal in question actually possesses 
similar attributes.  
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3.2 Reversing the allegory 
Lynette Hunter explains that “If, as Orwell suggests, words and worlds fossilize through 
historical accretions, allegory is a device for stripping away those accretions” (164). Words 
can thus be given new meanings through allegory or, alternatively, issues can be discussed 
using a different kind of discourse. However, it is important to remember that the meanings 
of words accumulate instead of replacing each other, and discourse draws new meanings 
from the subject with which it is used. While mistreated animals, such as in Animal Farm, 
have been used as an allegory for oppression of human beings, similarly human persecutions 
are sometimes used as a comparison to the plight of animals, in fiction as well as in academic 
texts. Calarco admits that such comparisons may be problematic and questionable, but also 
points out that “we cannot view the comparison of violence toward human beings and 
animals as scandalously inadequate simply because it compares human to nonhuman life” 
(110). I argue that Orwell has managed to address animal suffering in a context that not only 
compares human suffering to animal suffering, as the popular interpretation insists, but also 
vice versa. The allegory should work both ways. In his analysis of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
Julie, de Man speculates that we cannot be sure “whether the preface was written for the 
main text or the main text for the preface” (205). Similarly we may ask whether Orwell 
meant to draw attention to the problems of socialism or to the problems of animal welfare. 
The first alternative seems the most obvious, and this has been stated by numerous critics 
during the past seventy years, for example by David Dwan, who notes that Animal Farm “is, 
of course, a transparent allegory of the fate of communism in the U.S.S.R.” (655).  But it is 
precisely the fact that this comparison is so obvious that draws my attention back to the 
animals. It is as if the animal question has been left there, right before our eyes, with the 
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intention of capturing our attention with the obvious political allegory shining in the 
background. 
As Tiffin (256) points out, analyzing the story from the animal perspective does not 
suggest that the traditional readings of the novel are in any sense wrong or insignificant. 
However, “the almost exclusive focus on the human in the interpretations of [Animal Farm] 
draws attention to our habitual allegorizing of stories we take to be only ‘ostensibly’ about 
animals; our blindness to their actual presences as co-beings on the planet; and our 
determined conversions of their presences into absence” (ibid.). The generally acknowledged 
political interpretations of the novel do not rule out other interpretations either because, as 
Roland Barthes suggests in “The Death of the Author”, the meaning of the text is not 
something definite that is set by the author and his or her background but something that the 
reader is free to create based on a whole variety of meanings in the text: “a text is made of 
multiple writings, drawn from many cultures and entering into mutual relations of dialogue, 
parody, contestation, but there is one place where this multiplicity is focused and that place is 
the reader, not . . . the author” (148). Therefore, it is justifiable and even necessary to study 
Animal Farm, a novel with an established status as a political satire, from a fresh point of 
view – that of the farm animals – since it may give a better perspective of the culturally 
derived mindset that causes the negligence for the well-being of most nonhuman animals. 
 The starting point for my analysis is based on de Man’s view of allegory that, as 
explained earlier, challenges the inside/outside opposition of the text. The true meaning is 
traditionally considered to be hidden somewhere within the text, buried under its literal 
meaning, but if we question this hierarchy it is possible to find hidden meanings even at the 
surface of the text. In the case of Animal Farm this means that there may be significant 
meanings, hidden or in plain sight, that do not require us to interpret the animal characters as 
humans.  
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4. Animal equality in Animal Farm 
Given the time and the political environment when it was written it is not difficult to 
understand why Animal Farm has only been studied as political symbolism. In fact, 
according to Peter Davison (vii), Orwell himself has admitted that the book mainly satirizes 
the Russian Revolution but that it was also intended to be applied to other violent revolutions 
conspired by people who are subconsciously hungry for power, revolutions that can lead to 
change only in the ruling class while the initial problems stay the same. The question of 
animal equality did not have much academic support before Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation 
was published in 1970, but the fact that Orwell uses farm animals as a metaphor for 
oppressed people proves that the problem was conceivable even in his time. In fact, the Royal 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, a group that “was among the most 
successful of the bodies which continuously influenced nineteenth-century opinion,” was 
established as early as 1824 (Harrison 787-88). However, in the early 20
th
 century “the terrors 
of the wars and the humility of the Great Depression turned attention away from animal 
suffering and toward human suffering” (Preece 296).  
Towards the end of the Second World War animal issues took a step forward when 
veganism, both the term and the practice, was acknowledged in Britain “to identify those who 
not only reject all flesh and animal byproducts from their diet, including honey, but also 
refuse to wear or use any products made from animals or involving harm to animals” (Preece 
16). Thus, the ethical treatment of animals was definitely an issue already when Animal Farm 
was published, and the vegan principle that “no animal was to be exploited for human 
benefit” (ibid. 297) seems to correspond with the ideas of Animalism – the ideology created 
by the animals in Animal Farm – such as “no animal must ever tyrannise over his own kind” 
(Animal Farm 6, henceforth referred to as AF). In fact, the whole basis of the story in Animal 
32 
 
Farm asserts that animals are treated poorly: the farmer Jones and his men neglect feeding 
and tending to the animals, which ultimately leads the animals to break out of their pens. 
Defending themselves against the outraged humans they manage to exile Jones and his 
workers from the farm. By letting the animals speak for themselves, the text can be 
considered to speak against the mistreatment of animals and for animal equality. According 
to Drabble, Orwell was “deeply sensitized to the suffering of others,” both human beings and 
animals, and he used his writing as a means to make people notice the suffering of other 
beings and to realize “that they are not debarred from the experience of suffering by 
belonging to some subhuman or foreign category” (46). What Drabble considers to be crucial 
about Orwell is “his attitude toward the goodness of beasts and the beastliness of human 
nature” (43), which suggests Orwell to have quite an essentialist view of humans. Because of 
this essentialist attitude and the sinister ending of the novel, Orwell might have seen animal 
equality, like socialism, as an impossible utopia; something with a noble cause but, because 
of selfish and cruel individuals, a fruitless outcome. It is only the posthumanist viewpoint that 
lets us see beyond that humanist interpretation and understand how the speciesism of both the 
humans and the animals in the novel is what ruins the possibility for equality between the 
different species. When that speciesism becomes overt, the text can actually be read to 
support the idea of animal equality in many ways.  
 
4.1 Overt mistreatment of animals 
Animal Farm has several statements that openly comment on the humans’ neglect of the 
wellbeing of animals. The novel begins by describing how “Mr. Jones, of the Manor Farm, 
had locked the hen-houses for the night, but was too drunk to remember to shut the pop-
holes” (AF 1) and it is later explained that lately Jones “had taken to drinking more than was 
33 
 
good for him” and failed to take care of his duties: “his men were idle and dishonest, the 
fields were full of weeds, the buildings wanted roofing, the hedges were neglected, and the 
animals were underfed” (AF 11). On Midsummer’s Day, the day of the Rebellion, Jones’s 
workers “had milked the cows in the early morning and then had gone out rabbiting, without 
bothering to feed the animals” while Jones himself sleeps all day after a long night of 
drinking, “so that when evening came the animals were still unfed” (AF 11). When the 
hungry and outraged animals break in to the storage shed to have something to eat, Jones and 
his men go in to stop them “with whips in their hands, lashing out in all directions” (AF 12). 
Thus, the humans violently attack the animals they have already caused damage to by failing 
to care for their needs. As these actions are deemed unjust by describing the animals’ distress 
and hunger, the text can be read to disapprove of mistreating animals and also speaking for 
animal equality. Jones being one of the most common surnames in Britain, it can be argued 
that farmer Jones is meant to represent not only “the everyman” but also literally every man, 
mankind in general. This reflects on the issue that humans are generally quite negligent of 
animals and have little sympathy or respect towards them, especially cattle, at least in the 
sense that in the end they are merely bred and brought up to be killed and consumed.  
In the first chapter a respected board called Major gives a speech that functions as the 
moral basis for Animalism and provides the encouragement the animals need to eventually 
rebel against the humans: 
Now, comrades, what is the nature of this life of ours? Let us face it: our lives 
are miserable, laborious, and short. We are born, we are given just so much 
food as will keep the breath in our bodies, and those of us who are capable of 
it are forced to work to the last atom of our strength; and the very instant that 
our usefulness has come to an end we are slaughtered with hideous cruelty. No 
animal in England knows the meaning of happiness or leisure after he is a year 
old. No animal in England is free. The life of an animal is misery and slavery: 
that is the plain truth. (AF 3) 
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Major’s words difficult to disagree with, at least from a posthumanist standpoint, even when 
he points out the unjustness that “Man is the only creature that consumes without producing” 
and still “he is lord of all the animals” (AF 4). Here again, although the statement is not an 
objective one, the text seems to suggest that humans are the cause of a lot of animal suffering 
and that the relationship between humans and other beings is not an equal one from an ethical 
standpoint. It directly underlines the main problem of animal equality: humans exploit and 
even kill other animals for their own benefit without giving anything in return. For example, 
instead of using the constantly developing technology to ease or even cease animal suffering, 
humans have merely developed more efficient ways to breed, slaughter and process 
increasing numbers of animals in food production. For the animals the problem and the 
solution are clear: “Remove Man from the scene and the root cause of hunger and overwork 
is abolished for ever” (AF 4). This idea can be considered to be a quite posthumanist one, at 
least if we interpret the act of “removing man from the scene” to represent taking human 
beings away from their privileged position compared to other species and placing all beings 
on an equal level in terms of moral worth. 
Major’s speech also reminds the animals of the cruel fate that awaits them and takes a 
direct stand against the terrible position that farm animals are in: 
But no animal escapes the cruel knife in the end. You young porkers who are 
sitting in front of me, every one of you will scream your lives out at the block 
within a year. To that horror we all must come – cows, pigs, hens, sheep, 
everyone. Even the horses and the dogs have no better fate. You, Boxer, the 
very day that those great muscles of yours lose their power, Jones will sell you 
to the knacker, who will cut your throat and boil you down for the foxhounds. 
As for the dogs, when they grow old and toothless, Jones ties a brick round 
their necks and drowns them in the nearest pond. (AF 5) 
This statement comments on the significantly shorter lifespan of farm animals – for which the 
humans are responsible – compared to their natural lifespan, and it suggests that animals are 
seen and treated as a resource rather than fellow beings. For example, porkers, as Major 
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claims, are indeed slaughtered when they are no older than six months of age (Lappalainen 
166). According to Erica Calvo, beef cows are usually slaughtered before they reach eighteen 
months, although the natural lifespan of a cow can be as high as thirty years (37). Dairy cows, 
on the other hand, are taken to slaughter when their milk production starts to decrease, 
usually by the age of six or seven years (ibid.). Chickens are killed around the age of fourteen 
months, while their natural lifespan is about ten years (Grant 52). Thus, Major’s declaration 
is apt in criticizing humans.  
 The lyrics of “Beasts of England” – the anthem of Animalism – also indicate how the 
animals feel about the means of control that humans generally use: “Rings shall vanish from 
our noses / And the harness from our back / Bit and spur shall rust forever / Cruel whips no 
more shall crack” (AF 7). Here the text criticizes using physical violence and restraints in 
order to control animals, and when the animals take over the farm, they get rid of all the 
instruments of restrain and cruelty: 
The harness-room at the end of the stables was broken open; the bits, the nose-
rings, the dog-chains, the cruel knives with which Mr Jones had been used to 
castrate the pigs and lambs, were all flung down the well. The reins, the 
halters, the blinkers, the degrading nosebags, were thrown onto the rubbish 
fire which was burning in the yard. So were the whips. All the animals capered 
with joy when they saw the whips going up in flames. (AF 12-13) 
Especially the description of knives and whips as “cruel” is a clear indication of how those 
objects are perceived from the animals’ point of view. While for an average human a knife or 
even a whip can simply be a tool used for a certain task, for the animals they are instruments 
used for the purpose of hurting and killing them. Understanding this helps the reader to 
examine the text from a less human-oriented point of view and sympathize with the animal 
characters. 
Unlike the excerpt above reported by the narrator, some of the accusations of 
mistreatment are stated by the animals themselves, so it could be argued that they can be 
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biased, but it is important to remember that in literature animals are seldom – and in real life 
never – given the opportunity to speak for themselves. One aspect of allegory is that it 
juxtaposes “a radically different alternative with the accepted perception of the world” 
(Hunter 165), and Orwell’s text allows us to imagine what animals might say if they were 
able to speak for themselves in our language. The significance of language in the story will 
be discussed later in more detail.  
At this point it is worth mentioning that the narrator is not an all-knowing one, or at 
least not one that shares everything with the reader. The narrator only reports events as they 
are known or thought to be true by most of the farm animals – not including pigs, who know 
significantly more of what is going on than the other characters. Events that happen out in the 
open are basically reported as facts: “[The horses] knew every inch of the field, and in fact 
understood the business of mowing and raking far better than Jones and his men had ever 
done” (AF 17). Events happening inside the house, where no animals besides the pigs and the 
dogs are finally allowed, are reported as they are perceived by the animals outside:  
It was a few days later than this that the pigs came upon a case of whisky in 
the cellars of the farmhouse. It had been overlooked at the time when the 
house was first occupied. That night there came from the farmhouse the sound 
of loud singing, in which, to everyone’s surprise, the strains of ‘Beasts of 
England’ were mixed up. At about half-past nine Napoleon, wearing and old 
bowler hat of Mr Jones’s, was distinctly seen to emerge from the back door, 
gallop rapidly round the yard and disappear indoors again. (AF 72) 
The narrator does not necessarily tell lies, but does not state many facts either. There is plenty 
of reported speech, which means that when a character tells lies, the narrator does not correct 
him. He leaves the readers to draw their own conclusions on many issues. According to 
Hunter, the narrator is not an impartial one because “in setting the farmers off against the 
animals in the fourth chapter the narrator places himself firmly on the side of the animals” 
(181). Hunter also points out that the narrators “alignment with the other animals against the 
pigs by making the pigs more like humans in their speech, is a more subtle and questionable 
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stance” that is justified not by “what is said or implied against the pigs, but what the other 
animals have or lack in comparison to them” (ibid.). That is, because the other animals are 
not as intelligent as the pigs, the narrator sympathizes with the other animals, and perhaps 
invites the reader to do so as well. 
  
4.2 Animalism as an analog of humanism 
Major states in his speech that “All men are enemies” and “All animals are comrades” (AF, 
6). Therefore, he continues, “Whatever goes upon two legs is an enemy” and “Whatever goes 
upon four legs, or has wings, is a friend” (ibid.), which is later expressed by the other pigs in 
a maxim “Four legs good, two legs bad” that contains “the essential principle of Animalism” 
(AF 21). Doing this, they categorize humans and nonhuman animals with the same sort of 
“willful ignorance” that Derrida (“The Animal” 416) criticizes, using the number of legs as 
the defining feature, which proves to be a crucial point later on in the story. Thus, the farm 
animals themselves are guilty of speciesism as well, suggesting that even the defenders of 
animal equality are partly responsible for the problematic discourse used in discussing the 
animal issues. While they decide that each creature should have the right to a fulfilling life no 
matter how intelligent or useful they are, at the same time they categorize all creatures, 
besides man of course, under the same label: the animal.  
 Major’s advice to “Never listen when they tell you that Man and the animals have a 
common interest” (AF 5) – although true in the sense that even today humans’ interests are 
seldom for the good of other animals – conflicts with Wolfe’s idea that by surpassing the 
humanist and speciesist discourse we can get closer to equality both within and between 
species. Thus, although it starts off with good intentions, Animalism does not succeed in 
representing posthumanist ideas very well. Instead I argue that Animalism can be read as an 
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analog of humanism, particularly the humanist animal rights theories that initially have good 
intentions but that are not fully able to accomplish animal equality even in theory. As the 
story progresses and Animalism fails to protect a majority of the animals, it becomes even 
more evident that there is a similarity between Animalism and humanism. It is important to 
notice that although Animalism fails, it does not mean that the text denies the possibility or 
the need for animal equality. It rather points out the problems of Animalism and thus 
criticizes the humanist point of view and the speciesism that it participates in. 
Whenever some of the animals have doubts about the legitimacy of the decisions 
made on the farm, Squealer, one of the smartest pigs, is the one who is able to persuade them 
to accept those decisions: “[Squealer] was a brilliant talker, and when he was arguing some 
difficult point he had a way of skipping from side to side and whisking his tail which was 
somehow very persuasive. The others said of Squealer that he could turn black into white” 
(AF 9). As mentioned above, Animalism can be interpreted to be an analog of humanism. 
Therefore, because Squealer is a kind of spokesperson for Animalism, he can be seen as the 
epitome of humanist reasoning that justifies the suffering of animals which our conscience is 
arguing against. In this respect the interpretations made in earlier research of the pigs as 
political leaders is apt as well, since the acceptance of animal oppression in the form of 
factory farming, for example, comes from the higher structural levels of the society: it is 
directly approved by legislation but also reinforced by government subsidies. For example, 
the United States Department of Agriculture provides commodity programs that support 
financially certain segments of agriculture (“FY 2016 Budget Summary” 23). Their budget 
for grains used for animal feeds for the fiscal year of 2016 was 5.5 billion dollars, and the 
budget for dairy was 62 million dollars (ibid.).This means that as the farmers of feed grains 
are able to sell their feed at a lower price to farms, making it more profitable to breed cattle or 
other animals, the federal government of the United States spends billions of dollars 
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indirectly supporting the meat industry, in addition to the millions of dollars spent directly 
supporting the dairy industry. 
The role of the government is important also in the respect that consumers look at 
legislation for ethical guidance. According to a survey conducted in Texas, Illinois, and North 
Carolina in 2008, 69 per cent of consumers who had an opinion on the matter were in favor 
of “governmental bans on eggs produced under lower standards of care” (Norwood and Lusk 
342-43). This suggests that people want the government to guide our eating habits to a more 
ethical direction, and legislative measures are seen as necessary. Although individuals can 
choose to eat ethically without coercive means, most people decide not to do so. If 
governments continue to subsidize the meat industry and not issue tougher animal welfare 
legislation, consumers may take it as a message that there are no ethical problems considering 
animal welfare or animal equality. Similarly the animals in Animal Farm rely on Squealer 
and Napoleon, their political leaders, to guide them and inform them if issues regarding the 
welfare of their fellow beings should appear. Unfortunately, however, the pigs are only 
concerned on their own welfare.  
One of the most important details in the story, in terms of animal equality as well as 
human/animal opposition, are of course the rules of Animal Farm: 
1. Whatever goes upon two legs is an enemy.  
2. Whatever goes upon four legs, or has wings, is a friend.  
3. No animal shall wear clothes.  
4. No animal shall sleep in a bed.  
5. No animal shall drink alcohol.  
6. No animal shall kill any other animal.  
7. All animals are equal. (AF 15) 
With these Seven Commandments of Animalism painted on the barn wall the animals aim to 
become equal so that no animal exploits another. They also want to distinguish themselves 
from the humans in appearance and behavior, in order avoid repeating the problems that 
occurred when the humans were in charge of the farm. The commandments are easily 
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comparable to the Ten Commandments of the Holy Bible. Especially the rule “No animal 
shall kill any other animal” is quite clearly analogous to “Thou shalt not kill.” The Bible’s 
commandment is of course generally understood not to apply to animals, and therefore the 
commandment is usually interpreted as “Thou shalt not kill a human being” (Wolfe, Animal 
Rites 70), although exceptions even to this rule are also sometimes justified by legislation, 
such as in the case of war or executions. Similarly the commandments of Animalism are one 
by one altered by the pigs to better serve the purpose of the pigs rather than all the animals. 
For example, the sixth commandment becomes “No animal shall kill any other animal 
without cause” (AF 61) after the pigs have executed several animals who have disobeyed 
them. The Seven Commandments can also be compared to the “rules” of humanism – 
especially the ones that define “what is human” – that have gradually been changed to 
correspond with the times, such as in the case of slavery and racial discrimination. This is 
again an example of Animalism having an analogy to humanism. 
 The executions also make the animals realize that the violence is more terrible 
because it is carried out by their equals: “In the old days there had often been scenes of 
bloodshed equally terrible, but it seemed to all of them that it was far worse now that it was 
happening among themselves” (AF 57). Similarly the cruelty to any animals seems even more 
terrible when the opposition of human/animal is deconstructed and we realize that the cruelty 
that is happening does not only concern some unknown other, but that it is in fact happening 
among ourselves. 
 
4.3 The power of language 
As mentioned earlier, one of the essential themes of Animal Farm is language. According to 
Hunter, the story “is openly about politics and propaganda, specifically propagandic 
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language” (165), and Samir Elbarbary states that “the primacy of language” is established in 
the very beginning of the novel when Major gives his speech and is “reduced to a mouth” 
(31). The fact that Orwell gives the characters a common language is of course very 
important for the revolution of the animals to be possible, and later for the pigs and humans 
to be able to do business together. Although the idea most likely comes from the tradition of 
animal fables, where all creatures usually share a common language, it can also be considered 
to support Derrida’s argument that because language is something that man has attributed to 
himself, man does not have the right to deny that same attribute from an animal (“And Say 
the Animal Responded?” 137-38). In any case, the story gives animals the possibility to voice 
their opinion and feelings, albeit at different levels of complexity. In fact, Hunter considers 
the pigs’ ability to read and write to be “the key to their intelligence” (170) and thus 
fundamentally important to the story.  
 It is important to notice, however, that the pigs are not literate right from the 
beginning, but that during a few months before the rebellion “they had taught themselves to 
read and write from an old spelling book . . . which had been thrown on the rubbish heap” 
(AF 15). By autumn all the pigs can “already read and write perfectly” (AF 20). This process 
depicts a kind of exaggerated evolution of their mental capabilities. Based on the fact that 
evolution has allowed different kinds of species to develop similar features based on their 
need to survive in similar environments – for example the body shapes of sharks, dolphins, 
and penguins –  and because the mental features that make humans supposedly superior to 
other beings are clearly the result of adapting to certain conditions of survival, it can be 
assumed that in the right conditions similar mental attributes would become predominant in 
other beings as well through natural selection (Cavalieri 78). The illustration of the mental 
development of the pigs in the novel, albeit unrealistic, supports the idea that other species 
than human may also have the kind of psychological capacity that is usually considered to be 
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what makes our species essentially human, and that it is merely a matter of chance and 
favorable environment that has enabled humans to utilize the full potential of that capacity. 
Granting the pigs – as well as some other animals – these highly evolved capabilities, the 
story seems to take humans from their self-assigned higher position and place them on an 
equal level with the other species. 
 By the end of the summer “almost every animal on the farm was literate in some 
degree” (AF 20). Although in the case of many animals literacy means that they only know 
the letter A, the text seems to suggest that language, as Wolfe (Animal Rites 79) suggests, is 
in fact a difference in degree rather than a difference in kind. Consider the following excerpt:  
The dogs learned to read fairly well, but were not interested in reading 
anything except the Seven Commandments. Muriel, the goat, could read 
somewhat better than the dogs, and sometimes used to read to the others in the 
evenings from scraps of newspaper which she found on the rubbish heap. 
Benjamin [the donkey] could read as well as any pig, but never exercised his 
faculty. So far as he knew, he said, there was nothing worth reading. Clover 
learnt the whole alphabet, but could not put words together. Boxer could not 
get beyond the letter D. . . . Mollie refused to learn any but the five letters 
which spelt her own name. (AF 21) 
The different animals have different capacities of learning and different levels of literacy, and 
there is variation even within the same species, as the horses Clover, Boxer, and Mollie 
prove. McHugh makes a good point when stating that the “animals’ efforts to learn and to 
teach each other how to read emphasize that species differences encompass different ranges 
of abilities, and . . . that not all individuals are interested in or capable of maximizing these 
potentials” (“Animal Farm’s Lessons” 29). The fact that the animals range from the human-
equivalent intelligence of the pigs to the practically illiterate sheep and poultry disrupts the 
traditional human/animal opposition (ibid.).  
 The different capabilities of the animals are important for the story, because the level 
of literacy and proficiency in language is what, according to Hunter, allows the pigs to take 
control of the farm: “The other animals are limited in their use of language and cannot 
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discuss or debate issues effectively with the pigs; and since they cannot write and their 
memories are imperfect, they cannot check the original assumptions and decision they started 
from” (171). For example, when it is decided that the farm will begin trading with humans in 
order to acquire supplies, some animals seem to recall that Major had advised against trading 
and handling money. However, Squealer is able to convince the suspicious animals “that the 
resolution against engaging in trade and using money had never been passed, or even 
suggested” (AF 43). His strongest argument is written records: “Have you any record of such 
resolution? Is it written down anywhere?” (AF 43-44). Because no such record exists – 
except of course for the reader, who can check back to Major’s speech and realize that indeed 
“No animal must ever . . . touch money, or engage in trade” (AF 6) –  the animals cannot 
prove their suspicion and therefore have no choice but to be “satisfied that they had been 
mistaken” (AF 44). The pigs, who control the means of communication and have a far more 
advanced rhetoric, can thus persuade and govern the other animals according to their will. 
 Altering the Commandments is of course another way in which the pigs take 
advantage of language for their self-interest. However, even before the pigs begin rewriting 
the Commandments and perverting facts, the other animals have little influence on common 
issues on the farm: 
After the hoisting of the flag all the animals trooped into the big barn for a 
general assembly which was known as the Meeting. Here the work of the 
coming week was planned out and resolutions were put forward and debated. 
It was always the pigs who put forward the resolutions. The other animals 
understood how to vote, but could never think of any resolutions of their own. 
(AF 19) 
At this point the other animals still have a chance to be involved in making decisions. 
However, as the story develops and Snowball is banished from the farm by Napoleon and his 
watchdogs (AF 35-36), allowing Napoleon to assume dictatorship of the farm, the little 
democracy left in managing the farm is taken away: 
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[Napoleon] announced that from now on Sunday-morning Meetings would 
come to an end. They were unnecessary, he said, and wasted time. In the 
future all questions relating to the working of the farm would be settled by a 
special committee of pigs, presided over by himself. These would meet in 
private and afterwards communicate their decisions to the others. (AF 36) 
The decision that “there would be no more debates” (ibid.) results in the majority of animals 
not having any say in the decisions relating to their own lives. The situation resembles the 
contractarian model of ethics discussed earlier. In this case, instead of humans, the pigs are 
the once making the contract and excluding from it all the other animals, who are unable to 
protest because of their inability to remember facts and rationalize their concerns. The issue 
might not be as problematic if the pigs made decisions based on the common interests of all 
the animals and considered their lives to be of equal value, but this is not the case. 
Napoleon’s decision to order the dogs after Snowball already proves that he is prepared to 
use force and neglect the wellbeing of others to improve his personal situation.  
 According to Hunter “the events in the book cannot be helped because of the limited 
nature of animals” (167), as if the pigs were acting on some intuition that forces them to 
oppress the other animals. I argue that instead of some essential condition – an issue that will 
be discussed further in the following section – driving them into a position of power that they 
can abuse, it is their excellence in language that allows them to take advantage of the 
discourse that puts the pigs in a superior position. The pigs ultimately start walking on two 
legs and change the maxim of Animalism to “Four legs good, two legs better” (89), which 
proves that they have realized how a difference in kind can be used to establish superiority. 
Hunter also considers the point of the story to be that since humans are not as limited 
intellectually as the animals, we “have a responsibility to ensure that these events do not 
happen in [our] world” (167). Although Hunter of course means that we should not allow 
other humans – dictators, governments – to oppress us, the story can equally be interpreted as 
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telling us that we should work towards deconstructing similar scenarios of oppression, which 
have been and still are happening between humans and animals.  
Elbarbary summarizes his own view the problem of linguistic and intellectual 
variation within the animals: 
One may ask whether it makes any sense to represent all animals as a single 
community. Can a mass society divided by a wide range of linguistic variation 
and differences in intelligence, among others, be said to hold a single 
doctrine? Pan-animalism cannot be a reality. It becomes apparent at the end of 
the novel that the pigs have firmly secured their position. The inference is that 
a shadow of doubt is thrown on a second insurrectionary round as long as the 
linguistic oligarchy will sustain their exploitation of the animals through the 
monopoly of language. (37) 
Elbarbary is right in questioning pan-animalism, if we take pan-animalism to mean the kind 
of forceful labeling of all animals under one term. However, a society of creatures with 
different intellectual capabilities can still have a single doctrine, if the essence of that doctrine 
is for every creature to live a meaningful life. This is included in the doctrine “All animals are 
equal” (AF 15), which is the last of the Seven Commandments and the only one that remains 
at the end of the story – although with the ironical addition that “some animals are more 
equal than others” (AF 90). This idea of each life being as valuable as the next is not realized 
in the novel because the pigs want to abuse their position rather than to hold on the doctrine 
that called for equality for all animals, but rather than suggesting that it can never happen in 
real life, the story can be interpreted as encouraging us to rethink the “monopoly of language” 
that humans at the moment possess and how that monopoly is used to dismiss the animal 
others. 
 
4.4 Essentialism 
As discussed in the theory section, defining a human or animal essence is practically 
impossible and therefore a certain label, or especially privileges attached to that label, should 
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not be given to one species if not given to the other. For the same reasons the numerous 
animal species differing from each other to varying degrees should not be categorized under 
one label such as the animal or animality. Still, Peter Firchow suggests that the story of 
Animal Farm “becomes one of nature rather than nurture, of the essential ‘animal condition,’ 
as seen especially from the donkey Benjamin’s point of view” (105). Essentialism is 
definitely a recurring theme in the novel, but again rather than suggesting that essentialism is 
what determines the course of life, it can be argued that the text is questioning the logic of 
essentialism and the idea that there is some definite inner factor that makes a being an animal, 
or human accordingly. 
Some of the vocabulary in the text is curious in terms of the animal question. For 
example, the word “beast” appears in Animal Farm on a few occasions. The narrator uses it 
twice to describe the characteristics of horses. In the first chapter Boxer is characterized as 
“an enormous beast, nearly eighteen hands high, and as strong as any two ordinary horses put 
together” but “not of the first-rate intelligence” (AF 2). In the final chapter two new horses 
are described as being “fine upstanding beasts, willing workers and good comrades, but very 
stupid” (AF 85). In both of these examples the words “beast” is used in a kind of positive 
light, describing the grand appearance of these animals. In fact, according to the Oxford 
English Dictionary, in parts of England “beast” is used to refer specifically to a horse 
(“Beast”). However, the word has several other definitions that range from “A domesticated 
animal” and “A quadruped” to “The animal nature (in humans),” a stupid or loathsome 
person, and even the Antichrist, whereas the phrase “wild beast” is used to describe “an 
animal not domesticated, . . . now [especially] a ferocious animal from a foreign land” (ibid.). 
Therefore, although mainly used in positive or neutral descriptions in Animal Farm, the word 
still holds certain negative connotations, and especially when combined with a description of 
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low intelligence in both cases, “beast” can easily suggest an idea of an untamed, mindless, 
and possibly dangerous animal.  
 The animals themselves of course use the word “beast” in the title and lyrics of 
“Beasts of England”:  
Beasts of England, beasts of Ireland, 
Beasts of every land and clime, 
Hearken to my joyful tidings 
Of the golden future time 
 
Soon or late the day is coming, 
Tyrant Man shall be o’erthrown, 
And the fruitful fields of England 
Shall be trod by beasts alone (AF 7)  
Here the word is clearly used by the animals to refer to themselves and any other animals in 
the country. Although the word has negative connotations, the fact that the animals 
themselves use it can be seen as an attempt for the animals to reclaim the word and clear it 
from its negative meanings, much like certain groups of people have adopted offensive terms 
that have been used to refer to themselves by other people. The negative connotation of 
“beast” is much more apparent when humans use it to refer to animals, as opposed to the 
animals using it to refer to themselves, and Orwell’s decision to have the animals use the 
word “beast” is definitely not a coincidence. In fact, “beastly” was not only George Orwell’s 
first recorded word but also “a word that he continued to use a great deal . . . . ‘Fascist 
Beasts’ popped up everywhere in his journalism, not always in ironical quotation marks” 
(Drabble 39). Calling a person a “fascist beast” is of course reinforcing the discourse that 
disdains animals because it associates fascism with beastliness, with being an animal, and 
also suggests that the beastliness, or animality, of a person is what makes him cruel or bad. In 
Animal Farm, on the other hand, Orwell can be seen to be playing with the idea of what kind 
of meanings the word beast has and trying to show that the animals are in fact not the 
senseless creatures, the beasts, as the reader first might think of them. The animals are 
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generally shown to be thinking and feeling beings, but the pigs and dogs, who adapt human 
behavior – and perhaps also the human “beastliness” – to the greatest extent, are the only 
nonhuman beings who show evidence of cruel behavior. For example, even though Boxer is 
described as “an enormous beast,” he is also “respected for his steadiness of character” (AF 
2). Boxer and Clover also show kindness and consideration towards other beings as they 
move “their vast hairy hoofs with great care lest there should be some small animal concealed 
in the straw” (ibid.). Boxer even feels sorry for a human he accidentally kills in a battle: “’I 
have no wish to take life, not even human life,’ repeated Boxer, and his eyes were full of 
tears.” (AF 28). Snowball’s response to Boxer’s sentimentality is “’War is war. The only 
good human is a dead one.’” (ibid.) Napoleon proves to be quite cruel even to animals, 
including his fellow species, and he declares death sentences to several animals, using the 
dogs as his executioners (AF 55-56). By the end of the novel the pigs have started to use 
whips to control the other animals (AF 90), even though the lyrics of “Beasts of England” 
earlier declared that “Cruel whips no more shall crack” (AF 7). This shows that the most 
dangerous – as well as most unreliable – animals are in fact the ones who resemble humans 
the most. Questioning the beastliness of animals and the humanity of humans can be regarded 
as questioning essentialism rather than complying with it. 
According to Wolfe “concepts of nature are always inseparable from those of human 
nature” (Animal Rites 13), and the words natural and nature do appear in Animal Farm on 
several occasions. For example, when Major states in his speech that he understands “the 
nature of life on this earth as well as any animal now living” and denies that the poor 
situation of animals is “simply part of the order of Nature” (AF 3). This kind of reference to 
nature and the idea that it is normal and somehow unavoidable that the animals are exploited 
by humans are good examples of the speciesism and the problematic use of the term natural 
that needs to be addressed. The word natural often has the suggested meaning that something 
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needs no further rationalization, making the word problematic especially in defining how 
species behave or should behave (Clark 69). Major also declares that “even the miserable 
lives we lead are not allowed to reach their natural span” (AF 5). Doing this he introduces an 
alternate view of what is natural, as opposed to the one mentioned earlier. The question that 
one may ask is whether it is natural to live a free life and die of whatever cause – old age, 
disease, accident, hunted down – or to be born in captivity and live a short life with the 
purpose of being killed for nutrition for another being. Either definition can surely, from a 
certain perspective, be considered to be natural, which demonstrates the controversy related 
to the term. If anything can be considered natural, does the term hold any meaning 
whatsoever?  
The idea of natural appears also in the conversations between the owners of adjacent 
farms. They believe that the animals have resorted to cannibalism and other gruesome acts 
and that it “was what came of rebelling against the laws of Nature” (AF 25), suggesting that it 
is unnatural for the animals to survive without humans to watch over them. The farmers’ 
gossip about cannibalism – that the animals would not survive on the farm without eating 
other animals – also reflects the general attitude many laymen have about eating meat: that 
human beings will not survive without eating other – albeit nonhuman – animals. Eating meat 
is still often considered to be essential for human survival, and therefore natural, even in the 
industrialized countries where other nutrition is easily available. Furthermore, although the 
issue is controversial, it is worth noting that a myth of cannibalism was allegedly used in 
European colonialist countries as an excuse for colonizing foreign areas and suppressing or 
even killing the ‘savages’ that were the indigenous people (Obeyesekere 63-64). Similarly the 
farmers’ hearsay could justify a human intervention in the farm, since in their view the 
animals are not able to get along without humans. Ironically the farmers who spread the 
horrific rumors of farm animals eating each other would without a doubt have no objection to 
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a human being, such as themselves, eating the animals in question. In terms of animal 
equality it does not really matter if you are being killed by someone of your own species or of 
another species, and therefore the farmers are clearly not in favor of animal equality. The 
text, however, can be read to support the opposite of the unsympathetic and malicious 
farmers’ opinions and their ideas of what is natural, suggesting that animal equality and 
mutual respect between species would be a better option. 
Speciesism is apparent throughout the book, especially in the actions of the pigs, since 
the animals are categorized based on their species: the pigs become leaders because they are 
“generally recognized as being the cleverest of the animals” (AF  9, emphasis added) and 
“With their superior knowledge it was natural that they should assume leadership” (AF 17, 
emphasis added). This is an example of treating individuals based on what is typical of their 
kind, similar to what Paola Cavalieri (77) criticizes when she questions the idea of human 
nature – that certain behavior is natural for humans. Because of the abilities of their species, 
the pigs and the dogs in Animal Farm are allowed to live in the farm house – pigs as the 
smart leaders and dogs as their intimidating guards – while all the other animals live in the 
barn. The pigs are also allowed to exclusively have the milk and apples produced on the farm 
because they call themselves “brainworkers” and, as Squealer explains to the other animals, it 
has been “proved by Science” that milk and apples “contain substances absolutely necessary 
to the well-being of a pig” (AF 23). Similar faulty reasoning is often used when defending 
why it is necessary for humans to drink cow milk. For example, The Dairy Council, a non-
profit organization dedicated to providing information about dairy products, claims milk to 
have several health benefits, such as strengthening one’s bones and teeth, and reducing the 
risk of high blood pressure, obesity, type 2 diabetes, and both colorectal and breast cancer 
(“Health Benefits of Milk”), while at the same time studies have shown milk to increase the 
probability of prostate and ovarian cancer, multiple sclerosis, high cholesterol levels, acne, 
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and possibly type 1 diabetes (Campbell). While it is uncertain whether the benefits outweigh 
the risks, it can be argued that milk is not absolutely vital or even good for one’s well-being.  
The intelligence of the pigs is mentioned several times throughout the novel, perhaps 
to highlight the irony of the reasoning that because some species are more intelligent than 
others, they should be allowed act in a way that is clearly selfish, as the pigs do in the case of 
the milk and apples. Thus, the novel comments on the inequality of the different species, 
suggesting that the state of things is unjust and should be changed. In this sense as well 
Animal Farm can be seen to support animal equality.   
  
4.5 Human attributes in animals 
As stated before, if a text describes a nonhuman animal going through a thought process or 
having feelings of affection or fear, and we label this as anthropomorphism, we are then 
making the assumption that those thoughts or feelings are definitely attributes of human 
beings only, most likely without knowing whether the animal in question actually possesses 
similar attributes. However, as the pigs in Animal Farm evolve throughout the novel to the 
final stage where it becomes impossible for the other animals to distinguish them from 
humans, it is clear that much of the behavior of the pigs is, if not anthropomorphic, at least 
meant to remind the reader of human behavior. It is important to remember that because the 
range of non-human animals is so diverse and because their emotional and cognitive potential 
still remain unknown to a large extent, any narrative representation of non-humans is bound 
to be based on mainly factitious or human conceit (Norris 4). Therefore such human-centered 
assumptions are difficult to avoid. 
The binary opposition of human/animal is constantly present in Animal Farm. Major 
states in his speech that “in fighting against Man, we must not come to resemble him” (AF 6). 
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However, like other initially well-meaning principles of Animalism, this too is quickly 
overlooked. For example, the pigs move to live in the farm house, begin to sleep in beds, and 
start drinking alcohol. These are all examples of the pigs – the smartest animals of the farm 
and possessing the most human-like characteristics – giving themselves special privileges. 
The scenario can be read as a criticism of the traditional animal rights theories that wish to 
grant rights – special privileges – to animals whose mental properties are closest to humans. 
The pigs end up ruining the animal utopia because they are just as bad as the humans initially 
were, which also resembles the traditional animal rights theories having good intentions but 
being unable to succeed in creating animal equality, because they are still basically human-
centered. On the other hand, the pigs can also be compared to humans in general, and their 
actions can be seen to criticize the way we humans separate ourselves from nonhuman 
animals based our assumed superior mental capacities. Either way, the novel draws attention 
to the problems of the human/animal opposition and the empathy given to animals based on 
how much they resemble humans. 
 Initially the pigs, like all the animals, are trying to resist the anthropomorphism that so 
commonly is read in any animal fiction. Perhaps this is why one of the main ideas of 
Animalism is that “Whatever goes upon two legs is an enemy” and “Whatever goes upon 
four legs, or has wings, is a friend” (6). The point of these statements may not simply be to 
distinguish the bipedal humans – let us accept that the farm animals are not aware of other 
bipedal animals, such as kangaroos – but to encourage the animal characters to remain in 
their current animal state and not transform to anthropomorphic creatures. Finally, however, 
the pigs are unable to resist the literary tradition. Their transformation to humans is in fact a 
kind of reverse process of something called transmogrification. Transmogrification, “a 
special case of anthropomorphism” where people morph into animals, “has a long and 
respected history in many world cultures” (Burke and Copenhaver 207). Therefore, the 
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transformation of the pigs, as well as their initial hostility towards anthropomorphism, 
function as gentle critique of the literary tradition of having animals and animality represent 
human issues. 
On the subject of resisting anthropomorphism, Susan McHugh also points out that the 
puppies adopted by Napoleon and brought up to be his watchdogs “remain dogs, serving not 
as extension serving not as extensions of anyone’s ego or symbols of any people but rather 
(in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms) as a ‘demonic’ and irreducible figure of animal 
multiplicity, inaugurating the pigs’ campaign of terror against the likewise-transformed meat 
animals” (Animal Stories 182-83). McHugh considers that this point of view makes “both 
metaphorical and anthropomorphic projection” of the story much more restricted (ibid.). 
Having the dogs serve the pigs and provide a deterrent for the other animals so that they 
refrain from protesting differs little from the tradition of pitting animals against each other by 
using shepherd dogs to control sheep or watchdogs to guard hens against foxes or other small 
predators. Furthermore, as Donna Haraway points out, dogs have also been used as “lethal 
guided weapons and instruments of terror” by conquistadors against the indigenous peoples 
of the Americas (13). A comparison can easily be made between this example of humans 
using dogs to terrorize members of their own species and Napoleon using his dogs to 
terrorize the other animals, including pigs. First Napoleon orders the dogs to attack Snowball 
(AF 35-36), and later they carry out the executions of four pigs – as well as several other 
animals – who are accused of conspiring with Snowball (AF 56). 
 Orwell’s decision to put the pigs in charge of the farm is a question that may have two 
different reasons. Rodden believes that Orwell’s choice is based on cultural stereotypes: 
“Pigs have a bad name for selfishness and gluttony” (72). Portraying the pigs as selfish and 
lazy is therefore supporting this negative stereotype. On the other hand, according to Singer 
(119), Orwell’s decision is supported by scientific evidence as well: “Of all the animals 
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commonly eaten in the Western world, the pig is without doubt the most intelligent” (119). 
For example, in support of Singer’s claim, Lori Marino and Christina M. Colvin have 
“identified a number of findings from studies of pig cognition, emotion, and behavior which 
suggest that pigs possess complex ethological traits similar, but not identical, to dogs and 
chimpanzee” (15).  
 The pigs’ decision to keep the milk for themselves (AF 16) is crucial because it shows 
that they consider themselves to be privileged over the other animals, and are able to 
convince the other animals as well: “The importance of keeping the pigs in good health was 
all too obvious. So it was agreed without further argument that the milk and the windfall 
apples (and also the main crop of apples when they ripened) should be reserved for the pigs 
alone” (AF 23). The pigs are thus also the only animals on the farm reported to consume 
animal-based food after the humans are banished. The decisions the pigs make concerning the 
farm also resemble human behavior in the sense that they are quite selfish as well as profit-
oriented. A nationwide survey conducted in the United States in 2007 showed that 64 per cent 
of consumers believed farmers and food companies to “put their own profits ahead of treating 
farm animals humanely” (Norwood and Lusk 343). Similarly the pigs put profits ahead of the 
welfare of the other animals. For example, selling eggs to humans is protested by the hens, 
but they are sold anyway (AF 51). According to the pigs, of course, this should benefit the 
whole farm (ibid.). However, selling Boxer to the glue-maker is a trade that the pigs do not 
even admit to the other animals (82-83), yet “somewhere or other the pigs had acquired the 
money to buy themselves another case of whisky” (AF 84). A final commentary on the pigs’ 
tendency to put profit before the wellbeing of their fellow animals comes from Mr. 
Pilkington, who is amazed at how cost-efficiently Napoleon runs the farm: “[Pilkington] 
believed that he was right in saying that the lower animals on Animal Farm did more work 
and received less food than any animals in the county” (AF 92). This efficiency earns 
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Napoleon the respect of the human farmers, which implies that earning as large a profit as 
possible, regardless of animal welfare, is indeed a policy approved by farmers, or even 
humans in general. On the other hand, buying the whiskey as well as not sharing the milk 
earlier in the story (AF 51) are decisions that the pigs make most likely based on their 
preferred taste and regardless of common good. In this respect the pigs also show similar 
negligence as human consumers who care more about the taste of their food than the welfare 
of animals: according Elina Lappalainen (22), taste and price are both more important factors 
than animal welfare to a majority of consumers when making decisions about food. 
Therefore, in several different ways, the text draws comparisons between the pigs’ adopted 
behavior and the behavior of many humans. 
Some of the animals in Animal Farm, who perhaps have the least humanlike 
attributes, are clearly given less significance, even by the narrator. These are mostly animals 
that live in herds or flocks, for example sheep, hens, and ducks – “the stupider animals” (AF 
21). Wolfe calls these animals animalized animals, whereas pets and other animals with 
“ostensibly human features” are called humanized animals (Animal Rites 225). The decision 
to give names to some animals and not to others may be in order to emphasize that some 
animals resemble humans more than others, especially in terms of intelligence. For example, 
the sheep, who are not named, cannot learn more than one letter of the alphabet, whereas 
Muriel the goat is quite literate (AF 20). The ducks and hens, who also remain unnamed, are 
as illiterate as the sheep (ibid.), whereas a raven living on the farm has been given the name 
Moses. Although nothing is said of his literacy, Moses is described as “a clever talker” (AF 
10), and according to Marzluff, Angell, and Ehrlich, corvids generally have “exceptional 
memory and intelligence” (40). If it is perceived that some of the animals are left unnamed 
because of their low intelligence or lack of other human attributes, then it can be interpreted 
that the animals are not treated as equal. The hens, for example, are always addressed as a 
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group rather than individuals, and it is unclear whether they actually have names or not. It 
seems that the other animals also treat them as a unified group. Even when the hens protest 
against selling their eggs and afterwards are executed for their disobedience, they are not 
cited in direct speech or referred to as individuals: 
When the hens heard this they raised a terrible outcry. They had been warned 
earlier that this sacrifice might be necessary, but had not believed that it would 
really happen. They were just getting their clutches ready for spring sitting, 
and they protested that to take the eggs away now was murder. For the first 
time since the expulsion of Jones there was something resembling a rebellion. 
Led by three young Black Minorca pullets, the hens made a determined effort 
to thwart Napoleon’s wishes. Their method was to fly up to the rafters and 
there lay their eggs, which smashed to pieces on the floor. Napoleon acted 
swiftly and ruthlessly. He ordered the hens’ rations to be stopped, and decreed 
that any animal giving so much as a grain of corn to a hen should be punished 
by death. (AF 51) 
However, although the narration treats these animals with less significance, it is easy for the 
reader to sympathize with them rather than the humanized pigs who assume leading role on 
the farm. Scenes such as this can be taken as a reminder that even the smaller, less human-
like, and seemingly insignificant animals deserve to be treated with respect. 
However, naming the animals can also be interpreted in another way. First we have to 
consider a statement by Derrida: “Animal is a word that men have given themselves the right 
to give” (“The Animal” 400), meaning that man has granted himself the right to call animals 
as animals. As the validity of this self-granted right can be questioned, we can also question 
whether a name given to an individual animal – such as a horse – by a human being is 
meaningful to anyone but the human being. Therefore, we can argue that the animals on the 
farm are not in fact named by Jones, but by themselves, because in the novel the names are 
used by the narrator and the animals themselves, but never by Jones. In fact, it is explained in 
the very beginning of the novel that the farm’s “prize Middle White boar” was always 
referred to as Major “though the name under which he had been exhibited was Willingdon 
Beauty” (AF 1). Major having two names – perhaps one given to him by Jones and another 
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by his mother – would also support the interpretation that the humans may call the animals by 
different names than the ones used by the narrator. Derrida also states that “Finding oneself 
deprived of language, one loses the power to name, to name oneself, indeed to respond to 
one's name” (“The Animal” 388). The animals in the story who are left unnamed are the ones 
who are practically illiterate and have lower language capabilities in general. Therefore, the 
animals with lower intelligence or lower language skills – the ones “deprived of language” – 
are unable to name themselves, at least from a human perspective, and their fellow animals 
do not consider themselves to have right to name them, as it would be as oppressive as the 
human naming the animal. In this respect, then, leaving some of the animals unnamed would 
support the idea of animal equality and interspecies diversity as well as criticize the 
human/animal opposition and human superiority. 
As it was discussed earlier, the animals have different degrees of intelligence and 
literacy, which suggests that their intelligence should not be defined by their species. 
However, as explained above, this is exactly what the narrator does by treating the “stupider” 
animals as groups, and the pigs are also guilty of this form of speciesism. Based on their level 
of literacy, Muriel and Benjamin are both intelligent but they are not given the same 
privileges as the pigs. They are not asked to be involved in running the farm, perhaps because 
they are of the wrong species – that is, not pigs. Again, the pigs excluding other animals 
because of their species can be related to the speciesism practiced by humans in real life. 
Although some individuals are excluded from the privileged group, the text still suggests that 
they should be given the respect of being treated in a morally responsible way. The desire for 
that kind of moral responsibility is expressed in the vision – which at this point has already 
shattered – of the horse Clover: “If she herself had had any picture of the future, it had been 
of a society of animals set free from hunger and the whip, all equal, each working according 
to his capacity, the strong protecting the weak, as she had protected the lost brood of 
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ducklings with her foreleg on the night of Major’s speech” (AF 58). In Clover’s view the fact 
that each animal has some capacity and thus some importance is enough to guarantee equal 
treatment for all animals. In fact, in the beginning everyone did work “according to his 
capacity” (AF 18) and it had been enough to be treated as an equal member of their animal 
society. She also sees superiority – in this case physical strength – as a basis for moral 
responsibility towards the weaker animals: if one is able to protect another who is threatened, 
then one has the direct responsibility, as well as a genuine desire, to do so.  
Tool-use is an important attribute that is traditionally considered to be a human skill, 
although many other animals have been documented to utilize tools as well. Although in 
Animal Farm “no animal was able to use any tool that involved standing on his hind legs” 
(AF 17) it is implied that the animals do know how to use certain tools. The horses are able to 
perform “mowing and raking” using “the cutter or the horse-rake” (ibid.). Later, when the 
animals are unable to use crowbars or picks to break stones for building the windmill – which 
itself is the ultimate tool for the animals to manage – they instead use rope and utilize gravity 
to solve their problem: “The animals lashed rope round these [boulders], and then all 
together, cows, horses, sheep, any animal that could lay hold of the rope . . . they dragged 
them with desperate slowness up the slope to the top of the quarry, where they were toppled 
over the edge, to shatter to pieces below” (AF 41). These examples of the animals using tools 
in spite of their physical restrictions are an acknowledgement of nonhuman intelligence and a 
fine commentary on the similarities of human and animal inventiveness. Although this is a 
fictional scenario, it does direct our attention to animal tool use and problem solving in real 
life. There are plenty of examples of animals using outside objects to achieve certain goals, 
such as chimpanzees using a stick to clean each other’s teeth or a flattened stone to crack nuts 
(Hansell 181-82), a wasp mother using a stone “to hammer down the soil” over the entrance 
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of a chamber where her egg is buried (ibid. 187), as well as “an Egyptian vulture . . . picking 
up a stone and dropping it on to an ostrich egg” (ibid. 188). 
Although the seemingly endless process of building the windmill and its subtle 
connotation of Don Quixote, intentional or not, may be suggesting that the struggle of the 
animals is futile, the windmill also makes a point about the meaning of technology for the 
animal issues. According to McHugh “the never-completed windmill, the symbol of a 
technological utopia, fails to deliver the animals from exploitation as workers and instead 
becomes the means by which the pigs take the human role of working the animals to death” 
(Animal Stories 183). Similarly, while the vast development in technology during the past 
century has made animal labor in farming unnecessary and enabled efficient production of 
nutritious food without animal-based ingredients, technology has also enabled factory 
farming and multiplied the number of animals being killed for food each day. The windmill 
thus functions as a reminder that technology can be either a threat or a possibility, depending 
on who is in the position to use it. In the final chapter the windmill is finally ready but the 
animals, other than pigs of course, are unable to enjoy the technological advancement it 
provides: “The windmill had been successfully completed at last, and the farm possessed a 
threshing machine and a hay elevator of its own, and various new buildings had been added 
to it. . . . The windmill, however, had not after all been used for generating electrical power. 
It was used for milling corn and brought in a handsome money profit” (AF 86). 
In the final chapter the pigs start increasingly to resemble humans when they stand 
upright and start walking on their hind legs: 
There was a deadly silence. Amazed, terrified, huddling together, the animals 
watched the long line of pigs march slowly round the yard. It was as though 
the world had turned upside-down. Then there came a moment when the first 
shock had worn off and when in spite of everything – in spite of their terror of 
the dogs, and of the habit, developed through long years, of never 
complaining, never criticizing, no matter what happened – they might have 
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uttered some words of protest. But just at that moment, as though at a signal, 
all the sheep burst out into a tremendous bleating of – 
‘Four legs good, two legs better! Four legs good, two legs better! Four 
legs good, two legs better!’ (AF 89) 
To avoid any protest from the other animals, the pigs have trained the sheep to chant this new 
maxim of the farm. This once more suggests that the pigs consider human attributes as a 
credit that puts them in a more privileged position than other animals. In doing this the novel 
again criticizes speciesism. The extract also exemplifies how the less developed species is 
taken advantage of in order to reinforce the status of the more developed species. Critics of 
animal equality also tend to rely on the less developed mental attributes of some species – 
and even apply it to any animals in general – to prove their point of the human superiority. 
Again the reader’s sympathy is directed to the dumbfounded animals, who are left with the 
feeling that they are being deceived by the pigs. Although Elbarbary sees “the animals’ 
learning disabilities” as a barrier to a better life, he does note that  
there are a few oblique hints that the animals are not merely mindless beasts. 
They do have minds, they do think as we read that ‘they reasoned’ (78), and 
that they have ‘the thought that at least he [Boxer] had died happy’ (84), they 
also remember the issue of the pension field (85). This makes their betrayal all 
the more poignant since they are aware (if only obliquely) of what is 
happening to them. (37) 
Elbarbary is right, not only in that also the other animals are conscious and thinking beings, 
but that their consciousness and intelligence, no matter how small a degree, makes the pigs’ 
oppressive and unequal leadership unacceptable. 
 As discussed above, none of the animals are able to use certain tools that require 
standing on their hind legs. However, when the pigs start walking upright, their front limbs 
are finally free to new kinds of functions: “the pigs who were supervising the work of the 
farm all carried whips in their trotters” (AF 90).  
 While the pigs have learned to walk upright, the Seven Commandments of Animal 
Farm have also been replaced with a single commandment: “ALL ANIMALS ARE EQUAL / 
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BUT SOME ANIMALS ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS” (AF 90). This phrase 
sarcastically summarizes the whole issue of animal equality at the moment. The problem is 
not just that humans have put themselves in a privileged position over other animals – 
although it is the most crucial issue, since it indirectly causes the other problems – but that 
humans also put certain animals with most human-like characteristics in that same privileged 
position while other animals, intelligent or not, are considered less important. The new 
commandment is used as justification for any further privilege that the pigs grant themselves: 
After that it did not seem strange when next day the pigs who were 
supervising the work of the farm all carried whips in their trotters. It did not 
seem strange to learn that the pigs had bought themselves a wireless set, were 
arranging to install a telephone, and had taken out subscriptions to John Bull, 
TitBits, and the Daily Mirror. It did not seem strange when Napoleon was seen 
strolling in the farmhouse garden with a pipe in his mouth | no, not even when 
the pigs took Mr. Jones's clothes out of the wardrobes and put them on, 
Napoleon himself appearing in a black coat, ratcatcher breeches, and leather 
leggings, while his favourite sow appeared in the watered silk dress which 
Mrs. Jones had been used to wear on Sundays. (AF 90) 
No other arguments are needed anymore. Also, the fact that the pigs start using whips when 
they stand upright is curious. Instead of picks, crowbars, and other tools that require one to 
stand upright that were discussed earlier in the novel, they choose to use a tool of controlling 
and oppressing rather than tools of creating and building, and this is basically enabled by the 
fact that the pigs finally have free front limbs. I do not use the word hands because the 
narrator does not either: he continues to use the word trotter. The matter can be addressed in 
regard to Martin Heidegger’s idea that only humans have hands: “Apes, for example, have 
organs that can grasp, but they have no hand” (qtd. in Derrida, “Geschlecht II: Heidegger’s 
Hand” 173). Derrida considers the core of Heidegger’s argumentation – and distinction 
between the human hand and animal paws or trotters – to be “reducible to the assured 
opposition of giving and taking: man’s hand gives and gives itself, gives and is given, like 
thought or like what gives itself to be thought and what we do not yet think , whereas the 
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organ of the ape or of man as a simple animal . . . can only take hold of, grasp, lay hands on 
the thing” (ibid. 175). The opposition of giving and taking, thus, only permits the human “the 
possibility of giving” (ibid. 175-76). The fact that the narrator does not refer to the pigs’ 
trotters as hands emphasizes that the pigs, although behaving in a manner resembling 
humans, are still pigs and not humans. However, the fact that they use their trotters not only 
to grasp or take hold of things, but to give orders and give themselves the power over the 
other animals does suggest that they do have, despite of not being human, the capabilities that 
Heidegger would only grant to humans. Here, again, the text blurs the division between 
human and animal, and emphasizes the diversity of the nonhuman species.  
The maxim “Four legs good, two legs bad” (AF 21) may actually indicate that Orwell 
wanted to emphasize the animals’ intelligence. Although starting to walk upright on two legs 
is perhaps considered one of the most important phases in human evolution, but it is also 
possible that Orwell got the idea to pay attention to the number of legs from Rousseau, who 
writes that “A primitive [man] could consider his right and his left leg separately, or consider 
them together as one indivisible pair, without ever thinking of them as two [legs]. For the 
representational idea of an object is one thing, but the numerical idea that determines it is 
another” (qtd. in de Man 154). Orwell could then be suggesting that the animals are not 
merely primitive beings but intelligent creature capable of cognitive thinking. The fact that 
the animals use the number of legs to identify who is a friend and who is an enemy is even 
more interesting because, according to De Man, this ability to identify sameness through 
numerical thinking is in fact related to the foundation of society: 
the invention of the word man makes it possible for ‘men’ to exist by 
establishing the equality within inequality, the sameness within difference of 
civil society, in which the suspended, potential truth of the original fear is 
domesticated by the illusion of identity. The concept interprets the metaphor 
of numerical sameness as if it were a statement of literal fact. Without this 
liberalization, there could be no society. (155) 
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Therefore, “human specificity may be rooted in linguistic deceit” (ibid. 156), just as the 
specificity of the pigs is in Animal Farm. Not only are the other animals literally deceived 
through linguistic means by the pigs, but also their maxim and its subsequent version are 
proof that they have been deceived all along. They have let themselves believe that the 
numerical difference of legs can actually be used to determine what is good and what is bad, 
who is a friend and who is an enemy, who are same and who are different. 
Another detail that implies that Orwell may have been familiar with Rousseau’s work 
is the idea that “in the fictions [tableaux] of humanity everyone must be able to recognize 
Man” and that “every human figure must possess the common traits shared by all men, 
otherwise the fiction [tableau] is worthless” (Rousseau qtd. in de Man 197). The first five of 
the Seven Commandments are an example of the animals’ need to be able to recognize man, 
as they reduce the idea of man into very simple “common traits” that are supposedly shared 
by all men, which seems like a commentary against Rousseau’s essentialist philosophy: 
1. Whatever goes upon two legs is an enemy.  
2. Whatever goes upon four legs, or has wings, is a friend.  
3. No animal shall wear clothes.  
4. No animal shall sleep in a bed.  
5. No animal shall drink alcohol. (AF 15) 
The animals’ simple division of beings into those with four legs and to those with two legs 
makes the initial distinction, in addition to which they forbid themselves from behaving or 
dressing up like humans in order not to blur the boundaries. Of course, when the pigs start 
bending the rules and adopting some of the humanlike behavior, including oppression over 
the other animals, it becomes increasingly difficult for the other animals to make the 
distinction. This is becomes apparent, for example, in the fact that the animals are no longer 
sure whether the farm was a better place under human management: “there were times when 
it seemed to the animals that they worked longer hours and fed no better than they had done 
in Jones's day” (AF 61). Squealer’s function is to remind the animals of the fading distinction 
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between humans and animals, which is manifested in the animals’ minds in the distinction 
between Manor Farm and Animal Farm. Although the animals’ rations are constantly 
reduced, Squealer manages to explain, with the help of his documentation, that “in 
comparison with the days of Jones the improvement was enormous” (AF 75). 
What Williams considers to be unique about Animal Farm in comparison to Orwell’s 
other work, is that it is not a story about a typical Orwell character, an “isolated man who 
breaks from conformity but is then defeated and reabsorbed” (73) but rather, in McHugh’s 
words, a depiction of “a collectively distributed consciousness-raising that at the end shifts 
sympathy to the other animals” (Animal Stories 183). The sympathy towards animals is of 
course the essential message of the novel, in regards to the animal question. According to 
Hunter, when “the pigs begin to take up more and more foolish human activities, and as the 
other animals are relegated to a passive role because of their inability to communicate, the 
reader draws back from identification” (166-167). Thus, as the human reader feels less 
identification with the animal characters, it becomes clearer to the reader that the characters 
are in fact animals and not some animalized representations of humans. Yet at the same time 
as this distinction between the reader and the characters takes place, the reader still continues 
to empathize with the oppressed animals, debunking the significance of species for moral 
subjectivity. 
Changing the farms name from Animal Farm back to the original Manor Farm in the 
final chapter represents the return to the starting point: misery and mistreatment of non-
human and non-swine animals. Similarly, posthumanism emphasizes that following the 
humanist animal rights theories to improve animal equality will only lead to another state of 
inequality. An interesting statement is made when the pigs have human visitors: “That 
evening loud laughter ad bursts of singing came from the farmhouse. And suddenly, at the 
sound of the mingled voices, the animals were stricken with curiosity. What could be 
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happening in there, now that for the first time animals and human beings were meeting on 
terms of equality?” (AF 91) (emphasis added). It is unclear whether it is the animals or the 
narrator who asks the question, but it is curious that the pigs are referred to as “animals” in 
general, and not simply pigs. The party meeting with humans “on terms of equality” does not 
actually represent all the animals, but only the one privileged species, whose equality with the 
humans necessarily suggests a speciesist attitude towards the other, unequal species. If the 
statement is the narrator reporting the animals actual thought, it would suggest that the other 
animals do not yet realize that they are being treated unequally compared to the pigs; they 
still see themselves and the pigs as one equal group of species, whereas the humans are the 
one privileged species. The pigs’ relation to the other animals is expressed in a comment 
made by Mr. Pilkington, one of the human visitors: “‘If you have your lower animals to 
contend with,’ he said ‘we have our lower classes!’” (AF 92). Although this comment clearly 
supports the traditional allegorical reading of the novel, where the other animals symbolize 
the working class, but the phrase “lower animals” and their contemptuous attitude towards 
the labor – the comment sets “the table in a roar” (AF 93) – suggests that both the humans 
and the pigs consider the other animals to be less important based on their species.  
When the animals creep up to the window to observe what is going on inside the 
farmhouse, their vision of a unity and equality between all nonhuman species is shattered: 
“The creatures outside looked from pig to man, and from man to pig, and from pig to man 
again: but already it was impossible to say which was which” (AF 95). The final sentence of 
the novel is almost like a rhetorical question disguised as a statement: “How can we tell a 
man from beast?” Here I use the term “beast” because presumably the ending is supposed to 
suggest the essentialist idea that human nature has its dark side, its animal side, which makes 
man do inhumane things. From a posthumanist point of view, on the other hand, it is 
suggesting that the defining aspects of the supposed ideas of human or animal nature are not 
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restricted to any specific species, which means that such ideas do not actually exist. The 
statement at the end of the novel implies that any living being has certain vicious or selfish 
qualities, but that those qualities do not define the beings status as a human or non-human. 
The ending raises two other issues regarding the animal question. First, it suggests 
that humans are indeed not that different from other animals, just as Cavalieri among others 
points out: because human beings share over 98 per cent of our DNA with the pigmy 
chimpanzee, some authors have suggested that we belong in the same genus with the pigmy 
and common chimpanzees, denying any categorical separation between human beings and 
other species (78). Second, it denotes the problems of treating animals as sorts of lesser 
versions of humans, as some animal rights philosophies do. The pigs are accepted to the 
higher cast of species because they achieve a certain level of humanlike characteristics, 
whereas the “lower animals” remain in the caste of the animal. Wolfe points out the same 
problems in an applicable situation regarding granting rights to great apes on the grounds that 
they resemble humans to a great extent in many ways; not based on the fact that they are 
unique and different, but on the idea that they are similar to us (Animal Rites 192). This, 
according to Wolfe, merely reinforces the “ethical humanism” that is the problem initially: 
“Now it’s not humans versus great apes, it’s humans and great apes – the ‘like us’ crowd – 
versus everyone else” (ibid.). Similarly, in the end of Animal Farm, it is not the humans 
versus nonhuman animals, as it was in the beginning, but humans and pigs versus the other 
animals.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This thesis set out to examine different ways in which Animal Farm addresses the animal 
question and if the novel contains views that support or criticize the idea of animal equality. 
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The posthumanist theory offers excellent means to discuss the problems that are posed in the 
novel, in the way the narration portrays the animals as well as how the animal characters see 
themselves and each other.  
The novel gives some clear examples of mistreatment of animals that do not require 
excessive interpretation but can be read as a direct commentary of the position of animals in 
our society. It quite accurately states that humans are responsible for the discomfort of 
nonhuman beings and that something must be done to change the situation so that the 
wellbeing of animals can be attended. In earlier studies these problems have been interpreted 
to represent the problems of people living in a totalitarian society – mainly the Soviet Union. 
However, these interpretations demonstrate that the attitude towards animals in captivity is 
quite disturbing: while oppression of humans is understandably non-acceptable, the 
oppression of animals is considered to be somehow normal – a natural state of affairs.  
As mentioned in the introduction, the animals’ rebellion in Animal Farm creates a 
platform for a kind of posthumanist experiment. The animals “remove man from the scene,” 
creating a world without humans where all species start off as equals, with the right and 
possibility for a fulfilling and dignified life. The experiment fails because Animalism and its 
initially well-meaning principles are ultimately biased towards certain species, and in this 
respect they resemble the humanist animal rights theories. By indicating that the problems of 
speciesism only reoccur unless the discourse of the species is changed, Animal Farm can be 
seen to criticize those humanist theories and their inability to bring about change because of 
their commitment to the same species discourse that partly causes the initial problem.  
In earlier research, language has been acknowledged as a significant theme in the 
novel, and its significance is apparent in relation to the animal question as well. Both as a 
means of power and an indicator of intelligence, language is utilized by the pigs to gain a 
privileged position in the farm community, much like humans have gained in relation to other 
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species. The characters also partake in speciesist discourse and ideas throughout the novel. 
This can be seen in the relationship of the humans and nonhuman animals as well as in the 
relationship of the pigs and the other farm animals. The less intelligent species continue to be 
exploited even after the humans are banished from the farm, as the pigs assume the position 
of the superior species. Thus, the humanist approach that speciesism is a part of only helps 
some species while repeating the problems for others. These relationships are presented in 
such a way that the reader sees the problem of inequality in them. Therefore the novel is 
ultimately critical of speciesism. 
 The novel also addresses essentialism and the ideas of what is natural and what is 
human, which are very important for animal equality, or lack thereof. In real life, humans 
base their morals on those very ideas in order to dominate other beings through speciesism. 
By suggesting that certain abilities and attributes are essentially human, the novel constantly 
comments on the binary opposition of human/animal. The pigs, who possess the most human 
attributes, place themselves in a higher position than the other animals because of those 
attributes. As the reader is ultimately left to sympathize with the animals on the outside – 
species other than pigs, dogs, and humans – the novel suggests that as long as the 
human/animal opposition is not deconstructed, the initial problem of inequality between 
species will remain the same. 
Although there are often political and economic constraints that affect animal issues, 
meaning that major changes in animal equality require changes in legislation as well, it does 
not dismiss the importance of changing the perspectives of individual readers or consumers, 
since the individuals have the power to influence the legislation and the industry regarding 
animals. Similarly, individual readers may change the way animal literature is interpreted in 
the future. Because the species discourse and the binary opposition of human/animal is 
constructed rather than natural, they can be deconstructed and changed accordingly. A 
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posthumanist reading of Animal Farm shows that the issue of animal equality is a prevalent 
theme of the novel, and the story presents various ideas that are very critical towards the 
mistreatment of animals. However, unless the reader is able to be critical towards the species 
discourse in the novel and recognize the issues that the text proposes, there is a risk that the 
important observations that the text does about the animal question will be lost.  
Further research is of course needed, not only on Animal Farm, but on the vast scope 
of animal literature in general. Because the field of animal studies and posthumanist literary 
theory are still developing, it is difficult to say what the status of animals in literature will be 
even in the near future. Hopefully this thesis encourages other researchers to address animal 
issues in their work, as well as challenge readers to keep the animal question in mind even 
when reading classic pieces of literature with generally accepted meanings. A change in the 
general mindset of humans is of course an ultimate goal that could have an impact on the way 
we actually treat nonhuman beings in our society and in our daily lives. Unfortunately, as 
Timothy Clark points out, “a basic ‘speciesism’ is so fundamental and all-pervasive that it is 
still hard to imagine what society would be like without it” (190). 
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